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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Most members of the World Trade Organization agree that the broad goals of current 
negotiations on agriculture include language to further discipline export subsidies. Export 
subsidies may take a wide variety of implicit and explicit forms, including direct export 
subsidies, export credits, state trading and food aid. Agreement on specific limitations will be 
difficult to achieve due to the variety of institutions and programs involved.  
  The four broad categories of policy instruments discussed in this paper, namely, export 
subsidies, export credits, state trading and food aid, share many common dimensions. These 
dimensions include additionality, price discrimination and pooling. In addition, policy choices 
reflect a tension between achieving the goals of producer support and market power, and 
similarly, a tension between the achievement of humanitarian goals and use of implicit export 
subsidies. These cross-cutting issues need to be considered to understand why current policies 
arose and how they can be effectively disciplined in the negotiations.  
 
Export Subsidies 
Concern regarding direct export subsidies is focused on the European Union. Even in the 
EU, export subsidies are an unwanted consequence of other domestic policy goals. 
Quantitatively, EU export subsidies are large enough to influence world prices and so distort 
trade. However, distortions from export subsidies are small relative to those from tariffs and 
other trade barriers. The degree of distortion due to export subsidies varies by market and is 
largest for dairy. Relative to other policies influencing export competition, export subsidies are 
most likely to capture market share from competitors and least likely to expand demand. The 
reduction of export subsidies in the context of EU policy will require a much broader reform of 
their agricultural policy. Further reform will require changing either the extent of support to 
agriculture or the means by which that support is achieved. Past reform indicates this has been 
occurring, and it is likely that both reductions in support and changes in the means by which it is 
financed will continue. Reform of EU agricultural policy continues to be difficult as the EU has 
15 members and farmers have political power. Various proposals to reduce export subsidies will 
only be effective to the extent that the EU holds reduction of export subsidies as a priority.  
Recommendations include: 
§ Further reduce, if not eliminate, direct agricultural export subsidies; 
§ Maintain restrictions on both the volume and value of export subsidies; 
§ Consider rules to prevent circumvention (such as EU component subsidies); 
§ Eliminate the ability to “rollover” unused subsidies to future years;  
§ The issue of commodity aggregation in reporting requirements is secondary, as most 
commitments are already quite specific, and finally  
§ Also secondary, revisit the definition of export subsidies to account for consumer financed 




  Negotiations are underway in the OECD to establish disciplines on officially supported 
export credits, as agreed to the in URAA. In support of those negotiations the OECD surveyed 
the extent of export credit programs and the degree of subsidization. The estimated subsidy value 
of existing programs is generally very low. Country positions and economic analysis indicate ii   
that U.S. export credit programs are the focal point of concern, since 88 percent of estimated 
implicit export credits are due to U.S. programs. However, even for U.S. programs the subsidy 
values of the program is estimated at only 6.6 percent of commodity value. In all cases, the 
relatively low subsidies offered through officially support export credit programs are likely to 
induce only small trade distortions, and in some cases, export credits may create additional 
demand. 
  Recommendations include: 
§ Limit the loan term length as an effective mechanism to limit the subsidy component; 
§ Limit government budgetary outlays for export credits; and 
§ Consider differential treatment for developing countries. 
 
Exporting State Trading Enterprises 
State trading enterprises pursue a broad range of policy goals and implicit subsidies can 
arise when these agencies seek to support producers. The Canadian Wheat Board is a focal point 
of U.S. concern. At this point the position papers advanced for negotiations reflect a desire to 
discipline, but not eliminate state trading enterprises. While many governments support 
increased notification requirements as a way to increase transparency, to date most proposals 
have lacked specific detail making it impossible to assess the actual ramifications of these 
disciplines in practice. New WTO notification requirements for STEs provide a substantial 
degree of notification and should result in sufficient data to detect potentially disguised export 
subsidization. Requiring STEs to report transaction level data would be onerous, and 
unprecedented in comparison to other WTO notification requirements. The current WTO dispute 
resolution system should be evaluated in terms of its ability to deal with potential violations of 
GATT commitments by STEs. State trading plays an important role in implementing domestic 
policy goals for many countries; state trading is not likely to have a large impact on international 
markets; and reform is not likely to result in greater competition. For these reasons negotiations 
should limit efforts to discipline state trading to:  
 
§ Consider market power issues in the context of broader competition policy; 
§ Evaluate if the current WTO dispute resolution system is adequate to investigate violation of 
commitments by STEs; 
§ If further disciplines are enacted consider differential treatment for developing countries. 
 
Food Aid 
Concerns with food aid programs expressed in country positions have focused on U.S. 
food aid programs. U.S. food aid donations tend to increase more in times of surplus than 
donations from other agricultural exporters. While new disciplines on food aid will largely 
impact U.S. programs, they may have an important impact on EU food aid policies in the future, 
particularly if export subsidies are further restricted.  
Depending on the design of programs, food aid can be an implicit export subsidy. 
However, due to their size food aid has a small impact on world commodity markets. In addition, 
food aid programs are likely to create some additional demand and meet various humanitarian 
and social goals, factors that need to be considered in negotiations over further disciplines on 
food aid. As the goal of the WTO is to reduce distortions to trade, and as the effective 
consideration of food aid requires consideration of many other dimensions, questions exist about 
the role of the WTO in disciplining food aid. The danger in negotiating food aid issues in the iii   
context of the WTO is that other and more pressing questions will remain unspoken and 
unanswered. These question include whether or not the level of food aid guaranteed through the 
Food Aid Convention is adequate, how to target aid to meet the needs and concerns of recipients 
as well as donors, and how to use food aid effectively in the development process. The expertise 
that has developed on these questions largely resides in other institutions, such as the World 
Food Programme, individual country development and aid agencies, and private voluntary 
organizations.  
  Recommendations include: 
§ Identify food aid transactions that are not widely accepted as food aid and subject those to 
stricter notification and consultation requirements and to overall limits; 
§ Improve notification protocols under the CSSD and make this information easily accessible; 
and    
§ Exercise caution in new disciplines for food aid that could result in a reduction of overall 
food aid availability. 
 
Negotiating Strategies for Export Competition  
It may be the case that the EU is willing to trade-off their relative large general subsidies 
for the much smaller implicit subsidies in the trade practices of its competitors in food aid, STEs 
and export credits. If the EU is looking to the WTO to assist in disciplining its own export 
subsidies in the process of reforming its agricultural policy, this trade-off allows them to achieve 
this discipline while at the same time gaining concessions from their competitors.  
 
However, if trade-offs in WTO negotiations must be made on comparably valued 
concessions, then it may be fruitful to trade off EU export subsidies against U.S. programs to 
support farm income. Progress in negotiations will be facilitated by tradeoffs between market 
access, domestic support and export subsidy issues instead of being confined to tradeoffs within 
a particular category. 
 
Further progress within the WTO is likely to be slow since existing institutions reflect 
differing circumstances and preferences across countries, and these institutions respond slowly to 
changes in the external environment. Existing institutions also reflect trade-offs in achieving 
domestic policy objectives, and as limitations are imposed, policymakers will innovate to 
continue to achieve those objectives in the face of WTO limitations. The challenge faced by 
economists in measuring distortions to world markets is increased enormously by the variety and 
complexity of institutions that exist. An analysis of how they work in practice, and recognition 
that some of these institutions achieve important domestic political or humanitarian goals while 
having fairly small impacts on world markets, will be more useful to the negotiating process than 
advancing a rigid doctrine advocating for a particular institutional form, or focusing only on 




Most members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agree that subsidies on exports 
need to be further reduced and should be a high priority in current negotiations. Position 
statements of major players indicate that the broad goals of the negotiation include language to 
further discipline export subsidies, broadly defined.  
 
Export subsidies take a wide variety of implicit and explicit forms. Examples of explicit 
export subsidies include the export refunds given by the EU or the U.S. Export Enhancement 
Program, and these will be referred to as direct export subsidies. Implicit export subsidies result 
from policies meeting multiple objectives, and examples include export credits and food aid. 
Agreement on specific limitations will be difficult to achieve due to the variety of institutions 
and programs involved. In this paper we discuss explicit, direct export subsidies, as well as some 
of the more obvious mechanisms for implicit subsidization – including state trading, publicly 
supported export credits and food aid – which have been linked in position papers to the export 
subsidy debate.  
 
The catalyst for debate in each of these areas is one particular program in one specific 
region. The European Union (EU) makes extensive use of direct export subsidies and accounts 
for approximately 90 percent of global export subsidy expenditures (ERS 2001). The U.S. 
accounts for 96 percent of the subsidy value in officially supported export credit programs 
(OECD 2000a). While the use of state trading agencies (STEs) is more widespread, only the 
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) and a few other state traders are sufficiently large to potentially 
distort world markets, and U.S. concerns focus on the CWB (Josling 1998). While food aid is 
widely used by exporters, the specific problems raised in WTO negotiations focus on U.S. food 
aid programs. Although debate is focused on specific national programs, the WTO must devise 
general, equitable rules that apply to all members. Further discipline on food aid, and to a lesser 
extent export credits, is difficult due to the desire not to hamper achievement of the humanitarian 
goals addressed by the programs, goals that may be more important than disciplining export 
subsidization. 
 
Position papers from WTO members call for new disciplines, reforms and notification 
requirements for each of these issues. These issues have largely been raised by developed 
countries concerned with conditions of competition in international markets. However, the 
consequences will be important to developing countries that are recipients of food aid and export 
credits, that maintain state traders to implement agricultural policy, and are affected through 
international markets by export subsidies.  
 
State trading, food aid, export subsidies, and export credits all exist to achieve both social 
and market objectives held by national governments. While institutions like export credit and 
food aid could be abused to subsidize exports, the subsidy element of export credit programs is 
small, and the value of food aid programs is small compared to world markets. There is a danger 
that further disciplines negotiated through the WTO could reduce the benefits to recipient 
nations. State trading and even export subsidies are also designed to achieve domestic policy 
objectives. Export subsidization is generally a costly and unwanted consequence.  
 2   
The goals that governments hold for agricultural policy frequently attempt to meet the 
needs of wide-ranging constituencies, and consequently, these goals at some times are in conflict 
with one another. Governments innovate to resolve these inherent conflicts. Governments will 
create institutional innovations, namely more complex policy instruments, to try to continue to 
achieve their domestic policy goals in light of changes in the political and economic 
environment. One of the lessons learned from the implementation of the URAA is that when 
faced with new rules governments will innovate, often with unanticipated consequences.  
 
In this paper we examine export subsidies, export credits, state trading and food aid. The 
discussion includes a description of each institution, concerns within the WTO, how and to what 
extent the institution subsidizes exports, and its impact on domestic and international markets. 
First we examine issues that cut across all the issues discussed. We will re-examine these issues 
in the sections addressing each institution as well as in the concluding discussion of possible 
negotiating strategies. 
 
2. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES FOR EXPORT SUBSIDIES, EXPORT CREDITS, STATE 
TRADING AND FOOD AID  
 
The four broad categories of policy instruments discussed in this paper share many common 
dimensions. It is useful to first consider these common underlying concepts, and the issues raised 
will be further discussed in following sections. 
 
§ Additionality: Refers to an increase in demand due to use of the policy in question, since 
some implicit subsidies work through income rather than price effects. Food aid, targeted 
export subsidies and export credit may result in increased demand, benefiting all exporters 
due to a world price increase induced by such a demand shift. Targeted export subsidies can 
also in theory induce additional demand through income effects of price increases in targeted 
markets. The benefits from additionality need to be considered in attempts to discipline the 
export subsidy component of these programs. Weighing the two outcomes is complicated by 
difficulties in measuring additionality (the increased demand).  
 
§ Price Discrimination: Is the practice of selling goods at different prices in different markets 
according to their respective elasticities of demand. For price discrimination to be effective 
market power must be present. Price discrimination is not prohibited by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and is commonly used by private firms. Targeted 
export subsidy programs realize benefits (especially to producers) to the extent that they 
effectively price discriminate. Price discrimination is also an issue when used in conjunction 
with pooling. 
 
§ Pooling: Is the practice of purchasing commodities from producers at an unspecified price, 
and returning net revenue at a later time from a pool of receipts. The pool may consist of 
sales over time, across markets, or across commodities. Pooling is criticized as it is argued to 
give state traders greater ability to price discriminate. In many cases mandatory pooling is a 
feature of state trading, and it enables exercise of some degree of market power held by the 
government agency for the benefit of producers. Because pooling enables a degree of market 
power the issue of pooling and price discrimination become interrelated. However, private   3 
firms are known to price discriminate without a formal system of pooling. Also, if conditions 
of potential market power exist, the elimination of state trading and other government 
agencies will result in the entry of private firms who will not pass on the benefits of market 
power to producers. One possible consequence of pooling in conjunction with price 
discrimination is that producers realize a higher price and so increase production.  
 
§ Tension between producer support and market power: Refers to the dilemma faced by 
governments in decisions about the tools used to achieve their domestic policy objectives. 
Large exporting countries can increase their welfare through export taxes. However, the goal 
of producer support often dominates agricultural policy decisions, particularly in developed 
countries, and has lead to the adoption of other instruments, such as state trading and targeted 
subsidies. State trading is an institution that often funnels the benefits of power in the 
domestic and/or international market to producers. 
 
§ Tension between humanitarian goals and implicit subsidies: Food aid and export credit 
programs can embody a degree of implicit export subsidization. At the same time they 
achieve humanitarian goals valued by policymakers and their constituencies. Both programs 
may allow countries to import food and so feed impoverished citizens when they could not 
otherwise afford to do so. The dilemma inherent in devising stricter rules for these policies is 
that a trade-off may exist between limiting the implicit subsidy and achieving the 
humanitarian goals.  
 
 
Table 1. Cross-cutting Issues in Export Subsidies and Credits, State Trading, and Food Aid 











and market power 
Tension between 




￿    ￿    ￿    ￿     
Export credit  ￿    ￿      ￿    ￿   
STEs    ￿    ￿    ￿     
Food aid  ￿    ￿        ￿   
 
Table 1 indicates where we will need to address each of these cross-cutting issues in our 
examination below of the specific policy institutions considered to be explicit or implicit export 
subsidies. After considering each of these issues for the specific institutions, we will return to 
considering implications of these issues for disciplining export subsidies in the WTO more 
generally. 
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3. EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
 
Summary of Current Situation 
 
Uruguay Round Obligations 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) imposed disciplines on 
agricultural export subsidies for the first time and began to reduce the use of export subsidies in 
agricultural trade. The GATT has prohibited export subsidies for all other sectors on any product 
other than a primary product, when the subsidy results in an export price lower than the 
comparable price charged for the like product in the domestic market, since 1958. In the URAA, 
the twenty five GATT contracting parties with a history of export subsidies agreed to reduce the 
volume of subsidized exports by 21 percent over 6 years from a 1986-90 base period level (14 
percent over a 10-year period for developing countries) and reduce the value of export subsidies 
by 36 percent over 6 years from a 1986-90 base period level (24 percent over 10 years for 
developing countries). Countries with no history of export subsidies agreed not to initiate them.  
 
Commitments are on a product basis specified by the country at varying degrees of 
aggregation. Under the agreement, countries may not initiate subsidies for commodities that are 
not in their export subsidy schedules. Bona fide food aid transactions and widely available export 
market promotion and advisory services are exempted from the list of export subsidies. Countries 
also must restrict their use of other export marketing practices that could cause them to 
circumvent their export subsidy commitments. It was also agreed that disciplines for the use of 
export credit and credit guarantee practices were to be discussed in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).    
 
The URAA provided some flexibility in terms of meeting the subsidy reductions. If a 
country exceeded its commitments in any of the years two through five, it had to reduce subsidy 
levels the next year and assure that the total cumulative value of export subsidies and the volume 
of subsidized exports over the entire implementation period was no greater than the totals that 
would have resulted from full compliance with its subsidy schedules. No overruns are permitted 
in the final year of implementation; member countries must meet their final bound commitments 
in 2000/01. High world prices kept use of export subsidies well below WTO commitments in 
1995 and 1996. As world prices fell, many countries carried over unused portions of their 1995 
and 1996 commitments to make up for their overruns in later years. Some governments argue 
that flexibility provisions in the agreement are meant only to deal with situations where a country 
exceeds its limits and has to pay back —not as an opportunity for countries to bank and 
“rollover” unused subsidies. The United States originally argued that “rollover” should not be 
permitted. However after determining that the legal text didn’t explicitly ban the use of 
“rollover,” the U.S. invoked the “rollover” provision in 1997 and 1998 for skim milk powder and 
other dairy exports. The U.S. interpretation of the URAA is that export subsidy restrictions for 
2001 will remain in effect until a new agreement is negotiated. 
 
Countries also were permitted some flexibility in selecting the base period the initial 
reductions would be made from. Under the modified Blair House agreement, the reductions in 
quantities and expenditures on subsidized exports were to be made in equal installments 
beginning from the higher of either the 1986-1990 base, or the average of 1991-1992. Therefore,   5 
some countries “frontloaded” their export subsidy schedules so that their commitments in the 
first few years were higher than their 1986-1990 base levels of subsidization. Regardless of 
which period selected, the final year’s bindings still had to meet the 21 and 36 percent reduction 
levels from 1986-1990 base levels. This provision allowed countries to employ more  
export subsidies over the implementation period than they would have been permitted to had the 
reductions been made from the original 1986-90 base period. 
 
Current Use 
Between 1995 and 1998, WTO members spent over US$27 billion subsidizing exports. 
The EU accounts for nearly 90 percent of those export subsidy expenditures, Switzerland for 5.1 
percent, and the U.S. for just under 1.5 percent (Table 2). The EU is the largest user of export 
subsidies in both value and volume terms. According to WTO export subsidy notifications, the 
EU spent an average of $6 billion annually from 1995 to 1998 subsidizing exports. Over the 
same period, the EU’s volume of subsidized exports averaged about 28 million tons a year plus 
3.6 million hectoliters (95 million gallons) of wine and alcohol. From 1995 to 1998 the EU 
subsidized nearly all of its exports of coarse grains, butter and butter oil, beef, and skim milk 
powder (Figure 1). The majority of wheat and other dairy exports also required subsidies. 
Switzerland subsidizes exports of breeding cattle and horses, dairy products, fruit, potatoes, and 
processed products. Dairy products account for 65 percent of Swiss subsidy expenditures and 
nearly 80 percent of subsidized export volume, averaging nearly US$230 million and 59,000 
tons per year. Processed products account for 29 percent of expenditures for over US$102 
million per year, on average (volumes are not notified). Nearly 98 percent of U.S. export subsidy 
expenditures have been for dairy products (under the Dairy Export Incentive Program, just under 
2 percent for poultry, and less than 1 percent for coarse grains (which were subsidized in 1997 
under the EEP). 
 
Table 2. WTO Member Expenditures on Export Subsidies, 1995–1998, $U.S. 
  Expenditures  Percent of total 
European Union  24,369,052,020  89.4 
Switzerland    1,402,581,988   5.1 
United States       405,976,126   1.5 
Norway      341,121,230   1.3 
Rest of World      728,185,008   2.7 
 
 
The EU and Switzerland are so reliant on export subsidies because they choose to support 
producers through high internal price supports, which stimulate production above domestic need 
and require subsidies for export of surpluses. Both must also employ import barriers to keep 
cheaper imported products out of the domestic market. The size of export subsidies change with 
world price and exchange rate fluctuations, as the price gap between the domestic and world 
price is the per unit export subsidy. Hence, these policy regimes operate much like the variable 
levies formerly employed by the EU. In the EU, there is now one intervention price for all grains, 
which is currently 110.25 Euro/ton (102 US$/ton), to be reduced to 101.21 Euro/ton (93.7 
US$/ton) for the period 2001/02 to 2006. Given world grain prices, this common grain price 
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encouraged increased production of barley and other coarse grains. In both the EU and 
Switzerland, dairy production is supported by high guaranteed prices and production quotas that 
exceed domestic consumption. This is also true for sugar in the EU.   
 
Global expenditures on export subsidies by WTO members have been highest for dairy 
products, accounting for 34 percent of all export subsidy expenditures from 1995 to 1998. Beef 
is the single commodity with the largest subsidy expenditures, accounting for 21 percent of 
subsidy expenditures, averaging $1.4 billion/year. Grains, sugar ($745 million/year) and 
incorporated products (processed products) together account for 35 percent of expenditures.  
 
The composition of the volume of subsidized exports is far different from that of the 
expenditures. Grains account for 71 percent of the volume of subsidized exports, with wheat 
exports accounting for over 36 percent of all subsidized exports and coarse grains for nearly 35 
percent. Dairy accounts for only 7 percent of the volume of subsidized exports, though it 
accounts for 34 percent of expenditures. 
 
Most countries report that their export subsidies have been below their commitment 
levels. Over the course of the implementation period, the percentage of both volume and value 
commitments filled has increased, as permitted levels of subsidization have decreased and as   7 
world prices fell. Based on WTO notifications from 1995 to 1998, members have come closer to 
filling their volume commitments than their expenditure commitments for most commodities, 
even though WTO members agreed to larger cuts in their expenditures. Although past WTO 
notifications have shown that the value limit has been less restrictive than the volume limit, that 
could change if world prices remain low.   
 
Having both value and volume commitments constrains export subsidies in times of both 
high and low prices. When world prices are low, the value limit becomes more constraining 
because the wedge between the domestic support price and the competitive export price becomes 
larger. Volume limits prevent export of excess supply when there are low domestic prices. When 
world prices are high, the value constraint becomes less binding but the volume constraint can 
still be effective. Therefore, limits on both value and volume weaken the ability of export 
subsidies to maintain fixed internal price supports. Further restrictions on export subsidies are 
likely to motivate reduction of domestic price supports that encourage surplus production.  
 
The URAA does not place explicit restrictions on per unit subsidies and consequently the 
size of subsidies vary greatly across countries and commodities. Subsidy expenditures on a dollar 
per ton basis have been largest for such high-value products as alcohol, wine, and fresh flowers. 
However, those commodities account for less than 1 percent of subsidized export expenditures 
and subsidized export volume. In terms of sectors, dairy has had the largest dollar-per-ton 
subsidies. One would expect dollar-per-ton subsidies to decrease over the period of the URAA, 
because both permissible volume and value limits are declining over time during the 
implementation period. The use of the rollover provision has mitigated this decline and in some 
cases subsidies have increased overtime. Generally export subsidies have trended downward, but 
it is unclear whether this is due to market conditions and exchange rates, or to actual subsidy 
reductions. 
 
Overall Compliance with UR Obligations 
Overall, countries have abided by their export subsidy commitments, and as discussed 
below, some countries have changed domestic policies with the intention of meeting their export 
subsidy commitments. As of the 1998 notifications, 10 countries have exceeded some of their 
export subsidy commitments. For the most part, it is too soon to be certain which of these 
countries are experiencing difficulty meeting commitments, as most countries have not yet 
notified 1999 and 2000 export subsidy use. It is possible that some countries in danger of 
exceeding their commitments may have used minimal subsidies in those years. As previously 
mentioned, countries must meet their commitments in 2000 (the final year of implementation) 
and can exceed commitments in years 1995-99, as long as the cumulative total of their subsidies 
from 1995-2000 does not exceed the total of their commitments for that period. If a country 
exceeds its commitments it is subject to a dispute settlement panel.  
 
Two countries exceeded their cumulative volume commitment levels for one commodity 
for the full URAA implementation period by 1998.  This includes Colombia for confectionery 
items not containing cocoa, and South Africa for wine.  Cyprus is very close to exceeding its 
value commitment for cheese. Though a couple of commitments were violated, they had a 
negligible impact on world markets. The overall accomplishment of limiting export subsidy use 
during the URAA implementation period should be recognized. 8   
 
Policy Changes Due to Export Subsidy Commitments 
Export subsidy commitments have resulted in policy changes in a number of countries, 
most significantly, the European Union. The EU’s 1992 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
reform was necessary for it to comply with the first phase of implementation of the URAA. The 
EU recently expanded on its 1992 reforms, by enacting its Agenda 2000 reforms to lower 
internal market prices for grains and beef, so that it could try to meet its URAA final bindings on 
export subsidies. Mid-term reviews were built into Agenda 2000, to monitor whether the reforms 
were sufficient for the EU to meet their WTO commitments and meet the budget constraint set 
by Agenda 2000. The mid-term reviews could result in additional EU policy reforms. 
Additionally, the EU cut its sugar quota by 500,000 tons in December 2000 to meet its 
commitments on subsidized sugar exports and reduced export subsidies for incorporated 
(processed) products in 1999 to meet its export subsidy expenditure restrictions.   
 
The Agenda 2000 reforms, aided by a weakened euro, allowed the EU to export wheat 
and barley without subsidies from July to December 2000. It is likely that EU wheat and barley 
will be competitive on world markets starting in July 2001, when Agenda 2000 further reduces 
support prices for grains (assuming the euro does not appreciate beyond euro/dollar parity). 
Further cuts in export subsidy limits could provide incentives to further reform sectors such as 
dairy and beef (likely a moot point until the current BSE and hoof and mouth disease crises settle 
down) which are highly reliant on export subsidies.   
 
Other countries also changed policies to meet export subsidy limits. Canada eliminated 
its rail subsidies for grains in 1995. Switzerland began dairy reforms in 1999 to eliminate state 
trading of dairy products, and Australia replaced dairy export subsidies with rebates of a new 
dairy production levy and eliminated it in 2000.  
 
Not all binding restrictions have led to policy reform. Some countries have responded to 
binding restrictions on export subsidies by devising schemes to circumvent their commitments. 
For example, the EU has started to export some processed cheese claiming that it is an 
amalgamation of butter, skim milk powder and natural cheese and applying the export subsidies 
for skim milk powder and butter to the cheese exports. This has resulted in greater EU 
subsidization of cheese than was agreed upon in the URAA.  
 
Issues of Concern for Negotiations 
Export subsidies are extensively used in agricultural trade, and were permitted to 
continue under the WTO in spite of their high costs and market disrupting effects. They have 
significant, direct impacts on trade in some markets, and can create unfair competition that 
strains trade relationships. Export subsidies permit countries to sell goods on world markets at 
prices lower than prices in their domestic markets. However, in the case of large exporters, they 
can be extremely costly to employ. If the countries employing export subsidies are large, the 
subsidies can drive down world prices. An export tax, rather than an export subsidy, may have 
benefited national welfare, but at the expense of producers – highlighting the tension cited earlier 
between the achievement of producer support and the exercise of market power.   
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One means to resolve the dilemma between the exercise of market power and producer 
support is price discrimination, accomplished by targeting subsidies or by subsidizing via a state 
trader. A pre-condition for price discrimination is market power. Without market power, one 
cannot effectively price discriminate. 
 
Export subsidies create a wedge between the price of a good in an exporting country and 
that in an importing country, where the exporting country’s price is higher than the importer’s 
price. The lower price in the importing country increases demand for the good and reduces 
domestic production. Consequently, imports rise, and domestic producers suffer a welfare loss, 
while consumers experience a welfare gain. Producers in the exporting country experience a 
welfare gain as well, as prices rise and quantity supplied consequently increases. Consumers in 
the exporting country experience a welfare loss as prices rise and consumption declines. 
Consumers, as taxpayers, experience an additional loss as they have to help fund the subsidies. In 
the large country case, the decline in world price means much of the subsidy is paid to foreign 
consumers rather than producers.  
 
There can also be significant, indirect effects of export subsidy reforms because they help  
set the stage for reforms in other areas. Constraints on export subsidies that are used to dispose of 
surplus production will create pressures to restructure domestic subsidies in ways that are less 
distorting of production and trade. If countries that employ high support prices and import 
barriers are required to reduce or eliminate their export subsidies by reducing support prices, 
they may be more willing to reduce tariffs at the same time. For example, the EU’s variable levy 
for grains would decrease with a decline in support prices, increasing market access to other 
countries.  
 
There is a wealth of literature examining why governments continue to employ export 
subsidies. Though export subsidies can be welfare enhancing, due to political pressures the 
programs are often not targeted in such a way to achieve those benefits. Studies from the late 
1980s and early 1990s tended to focus on the implications of targeted in-kind subsidies such as 
the U.S. Export Enhancement Program. Sharples (1984) found that the subsidizing country could 
enhance its welfare by subsidizing, provided the world price impact was larger than the cost of 
the subsidy, and that the more elastic the market the larger the welfare gain. Abbott, Paarlberg, 
and Sharples (1987) found that both the subsidizing country and competing exporters may 
benefit from an increase in world price if targeting is effective. However, the realization of 
benefits depends on the impact of the targeted subsidies on spatial trade relationships. If 
competitors incur higher transportation costs due to a change in spatial trade relationships then 
they may not benefit from induced increases in the world price.  
 
 Brander and Spencer (1985) found that given imperfect competition, the terms of trade 
move against the subsidizing country, but its welfare can increase because price exceeds the 
marginal cost of exports. Bohman, Carter, and Dorfman (1991) analyzed the welfare effects of 
targeted export subsidies and found that the ability for a targeted subsidy to be welfare 
improving is inversely related to the size of the subsidized market, as well as the relative sizes of 
income elasticities.   
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Many other studies found export subsidies to reduce welfare in the exporting country, 
often because the parameters of the program differed from what theory would suggest as optimal 
policy. For example, Anania, Bohman, and Carter (1992) found that no exporting country 
benefited from the U.S. Export Enhancement program and that the EU, the intended target, was 
barely harmed. At the same time, U.S. exports increased only minimally at a great cost to the 
U.S. government.       
 
Due to evidence that brand loyalty exists in international wheat markets (Wilson, Koo, 
Carter and Tedros 1987) Kallio and Abbott (1998) analyzed U.S.-EU competition for Moroccan 
wheat imports. They found that if markets are imperfect and there are costs associated with 
switching suppliers, the welfare of the subsidizing country can increase by expanding market 
share using export subsidies. This result confirms that countries experience trade advantages 
through the use of export subsidies. The key is that targeted export subsidies can only work if 
they expand the market and increase the subsidizing country’s market share. Thus, targeted 
export subsidies which generate additional demand can potentially benefit all exporters, but 
those which only capture market share hurt competitors. The outcome depends on how well 
subsidies are targeted. 
 
The Economic Research Service (ERS) of the USDA (Leetmaa 2001) analyzed the 
impact of EU export subsidy elimination on world markets. Results indicate the EU would 
continue to have exportable surpluses of all grains, while it would to be unable to export beef. 
The world price of most goods would increase between 5 and 10 percent. As mentioned earlier, 
the single support price for all grains supports barley and rye. The ERS study finds that the world 
price of wheat would decline roughly 5 percent, as EU exports would increase following 
production shifts out of lower priced crops such as barley and rye.   
 
The OECD (2000b) also analyzed global export subsidy elimination. They too find that 
export subsidy elimination results in fairly modest world price impacts, altering non-dairy 
commodity prices by 1–5 percent. They found that world wheat and oilseed prices would decline 
slightly. The largest impacts in the OECD study were on world dairy markets, which were 
omitted from the ERS study, increasing world prices 6–30 percent. The OECD study found that 
EU exports of butter and skim milk powder would be severely reduced by 2005, while EU 
cheese exports would increase. In the case of cheese, the EU internal price would fall by 5 
percent and the world price would increase 10 percent on average. They also found that EU milk 
price changes would not be large enough to cause EU milk producers to underfill their quotas, so 
the production quota would continue to be binding.  
 
Issues Requiring Clarification 
One problem encountered while analyzing the export subsidy notifications is that there is 
a lack of consistency across the notifications. Though there are 25 commodity groups (including 
one called other), aggregation within those groups differs significantly across countries. 
Switzerland notifies all dairy products as one category, whereas all other countries break dairy 
out into cheese, milk powder, butter, and other dairy products. The larger, or more general, the 
subject category is, the easier it is to shift subsidies among products. Many countries narrow 
commodity groups to include 4 or 5 six-digit HS codes. If countries negotiate a more specific   11 
commodity specification, that would limit the ability of countries to transfer unused subsidies 
across commodities.   
 
Schluep and de Gorter (2000) argue that export subsidies are inadequately dealt with in 
the URAA, as the current definition omits an implicit export subsidy in the form of price 
discrimination and revenue pooling in the form of a “consumer only financed” export subsidy 
and poorly defines “producer financed” export subsidies. They argue that consumer only 
financed export subsidies are more trade distorting than the same sized taxpayer financed export 
subsidies, as domestic price discrimination drives down domestic consumption, increasing the 
trade distortion. They also argue that the WTO panel ruling on Canadian dairy policy was 
erroneous in that it ruled that class Ve and Vd milk was subsidized, whereas class Vabc milk, 
whose price is pooled, should have been classified as subsidized, but was not. These 
misclassifications arise because of the weakness in the definition of export subsidies. But 
establishing such definitions can be problematic for several reasons discussed below – since 
world price is difficult to measure, especially for differentiated products, and we can observe 
market structure more clearly than conduct or performance. 
 
Sumner (1996) argues that a consumer only financed export subsidy exists when a non-
traded good such as fluid milk faces domestic price discrimination, but the dairy products 
produced from that milk are traded at world prices. High domestic prices reduce consumption of 
fluid milk, however if revenues are pooled farmers’ production increases, and the pooling acts as 
an export subsidy. The WTO panel decision against the Canadian Dairy Board demonstrates that 
the WTO is not in favor of price pooling – a form of market structure which can lead to price 
discrimination. However there are many programs where the producer receives a pooled price 
that combines a higher domestic price and lower world price (for example, the California Raisin 
Board) which have not been subjected to WTO discipline.   
 
The component of price pooling that categorizes it as an export subsidy is price 
discrimination. In the case of joint products, such as fluid milk and processed dairy products, it is 
often difficult to determine whether price discrimination actually occurs. For example, it is 
possible that the exporting country doesn’t consume the product that it exports, or it exports a 
lower quality product than it domestically consumes. In those cases, it would be difficult to 
prove that they are price discriminating. Agricultural commodities are not homogeneous (Haley 
1995); there is much variation in quality characteristics of similar goods. In fact, products are 
becoming more and more differentiated over time. Therefore it is often difficult to prove price 




The URAA did not discipline export taxes. Export taxes had not been used by major 
exporters for many years, and it is likely that negotiators believed they wouldn’t be used any 
time in the future. However, in 1995-96, world wheat and barley prices rose above the EU 
support price for grains. EU exports were drawing down domestic stocks and the EU instituted 
export taxes to prevent domestic prices from rising, thereby, disadvantaging end-users such as 
livestock feeders and/or millers. The consequence was a reduction in EU exports. This was the 
first time the EU taxed grain exports since 1974. Since the EU is a large player in world grain 12   
markets, reducing exports in a time of scarcity resulted in a larger global price increase than 
would have occurred without the export taxes.  
 
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland also have employed export taxes on grains 
during the URAA implementation period. While support for restrictions on export taxes is 
widespread, developing countries in particular support disciplines on export taxes to prevent 
countries from forcing the burden of adjustment solely onto world markets. An argument could 
also be made that discipline on export taxes would limit the exercise of market power in trade, 
but that has not been an important element of current debate.  
 
Developing countries also employ export taxes. The use of export taxes on primary 
products is, for many of the poorest developing countries, a major means of generating tax 
revenue. Egypt used to maintain domestic cotton prices below the world price, taxing its 
producers, and until 1994 Argentina taxed exports of wheat, sometimes at levels of 25 percent or 
more. Developing countries are in favor of employing export taxes to raise revenue for 
themselves. However, they are not in favor of large exporters with market power using them to 
distort world markets by increasing world prices. 
 
 Market Promotion Activities 
  Some countries argue that U.S. market promotion activities should be subject to export 
subsidy disciplines. However, Article 9, Section 1d exempts widely used export promotion and 
advisory services from export subsidy reduction commitments.  At this point U.S. market 
promotion activities are exempt from WTO disciplines. 
 
Zero for Zero 
One proposal that some commodity and interest groups have been pushing is the so-
called “zero for zero” proposal. Under zero for zero, all support would be eliminated for a single 
commodity or a group of commodities by all members of the WTO. Some commodity groups 
have called for a zero for zero program for their commodity. Based on WTO notifications, the 
only commodity group for which a zero for zero program is unlikely to face much opposition in 
the way of export subsidies is oilcakes. Not one country notified subsidized exports of oilcakes 
from 1995 to 1998. Other commodities where zero for zero would be feasible in terms of export 
subsidies would be cotton (S. Africa subsidized exports in 1995, but has since abandoned its 
export subsidy program), and oilseeds (which were subsidized by S. Africa in 1995 and Hungary 
in 1995 and 1996). However, countries may be reluctant to give up the possibility of subsidizing 
their exports in the future. Unless countries are given the opportunity to select one or two 
commodities that they would be willing to give up the possibility of export subsidies for, a zero 
for zero program would most likely not be viable in the WTO. As the EU dominates the use of 
export subsidies, zero for zero is unlikely to offer many opportunities where countries can trade-
off existing subsidies. 
 
Negotiating Positions 
In the past year, countries have been submitting position papers on their goals for the 
Millennium Round to the WTO. In terms of export subsidies countries fall largely into two 
camps, those that want to eliminate export subsidies and those who stress that all export 
disciplines should be treated in a comprehensive matter. Only Mauritius has come out in favor of   13 
export subsidies, stating that “export subsidies as well as export credits do facilitate economic 
access to food in the case of net food importing developing countries” (WTO 2000a). The Cairns 
Group and the United States are leading the charge for the elimination of export subsidies. A 
number of developing countries are also in favor of export subsidy elimination because they 
depress their domestic prices and discourage domestic production.
1 There are also a number of 
developing and middle income countries that as exporters of agricultural products would benefit 
from higher world prices if competitors’ subsidies were removed.  
 
The European Union and Japan (which does not employ export subsidies) are in favor of 
reducing export subsidies provided all export measures are disciplined. The programs they are 
looking to discipline are export credits and food aid, which are covered later in this paper. Japan 
is also in favor of banning “rollover,” binding export subsidy unit values and reducing them 
progressively, strengthening disciplines on export subsidies for products and markets in which 
developing countries are participants, and disciplining domestic support policies that have the 
effect of export subsidies. Potential tradeoffs and suggestions to reconcile the differences are 
discussed in conclusions to the paper.  
 
Options for Reform and Conclusions 
The inclusion of disciplines on export subsidies was a major accomplishment of the 
URAA. Some argue that base period levels from the URAA may not have been representative of 
subsidized export flows in the early 1990s and may have permitted an increase in subsidized 
exports during the implementation period. However, these initial bindings encouraged countries, 
such as the EU, to sign the URAA. It is likely that future cuts will be made from the final 2000–
01 bound levels, therefore permitted expenditures and volumes are likely to decrease from the 
initial bound rates. Some economists have argued for additional cuts at the same pace of the 
URAA reforms. If export subsidies were cut by an additional 21 and 36 percent from the original 
base values, permitted volumes would be 58 percent of those in the base period and expenditures 
28 percent of those in the base period. Though export subsidies would still exist, such cuts would 
require severe policy reforms in the countries that employ export subsidies, and would be a 
serious step on the way to export subsidy elimination. 
 
To date, members of the WTO have voiced support for the reduction of export subsidies 
in the upcoming round of agricultural negotiations. Additionally, members have tried to meet 
their export subsidy commitments and many have made domestic policy changes to ensure that 
the commitments are met.   
 
The EU would be the region most impacted by further reductions in direct export 
subsidies as it would require further policy changes. There are forces at work within the EU that 
are moving toward such policy change, though it may be gradual, and positions taken in trade 
negotiations usually reflect domestic priorities for change. This is evidenced by Franz Fischler’s 
original Agenda 2000 proposal, which called for larger support price cuts to happen sooner than 
those agreed to by the Heads of State in the final agreement. Agenda 2000 also fixed the 
                                                 
1  Among the developing and transition economies advocating for further restrictions on export subsidies are 
Thailand, Korea, India, Cairns group, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Egypt, Haiti, Nicaragua, 
Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, El Salvador, and Poland. 
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agricultural budget at 40.5 billion euros per year in real terms for the period 2000–06. Hence, 
there is budgetary pressure to reduce agricultural spending. In light of the budget constraint and 
possibly the EU’s WTO commitments, Agenda 2000 also included a mid-term review to assess 
whether the program was meeting the EU’s objectives. The mid-term reviews are scheduled to 
begin shortly and could result in further reforms. The impending enlargement of the EU to 
Central and Eastern Europe and the EU’s current BSE crisis, which is proving to be very costly, 
will also create pressure to reform EU agriculture.   
 
Future EU reforms are likely to follow the paths of the 1992 MacSharry and Agenda 
2000 reforms, which reduced support prices and supplemented farmers’ incomes through direct 
payments. As the EU makes a transition from use of export subsidies to direct payments to 
support EU producers, there will be less distortion to world prices. Key options for reform follow 













4. EXPORT CREDIT 
 
Summary of Current Situation 
Short-term export credit is viewed by the trade as essential to many international 
transactions, and is necessary for doing business in international agricultural markets.          
Governments are commonly involved in export credit activity, both for agriculture and for many 
other commodities. This government involvement is now referred to in the OECD and in the 
WTO as “officially supported export credit.” Government involvement in export credits include: 
 
§ Public and parastatal agencies directly offer credit (including state traders); 
§ Interest rate subsidies may be offered by a government; 
§ Governments may assume default risk for private loans; and 
§ Publicly supported or subsidized insurance may be offered to private lenders. 
 
For agricultural commodities, default risk guarantees are the most common form of 
officially supported export credit. Insurance schemes and credit offered by state trading agencies 
are also found. Explicit interest rate subsidies are not commonly used for agricultural trade. 
 
Officially supported export credits are a subject for WTO negotiations because 
“Government supported export credits are seen as a way of circumventing export subsidy 
commitments because interest rates and repayment terms can be easier than under normal 
Box 1: Export Subsidy Options for Reform 
§ Further reduce, if not eliminate, direct agricultural export subsidies; 
§ Maintain restrictions on both the volume and value of export subsidies; 
§ Consider rules to prevent circumvention (such as EU component subsidies); 
§ Eliminate the ability to “rollover” unused subsidies to future years;  
§ The issue of commodity aggregation in reporting requirements is secondary, as most 
commitments are already quite specific, and finally  
§ Also secondary, revisit the definition of export subsidies to account for consumer 
financed subsidies and cross subsidization across commodities. 
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commercial conditions” (WTO 2001a). Hence, in past and future negotiations concerning export 
subsidies, disciplines on officially supported export credits have been considered, and the 
European Union asks that export credits be disciplined as well as other forms of subsidies.  
 
WTO and OECD Negotiations on Export Credit   
The possibility that officially supported export credits could act as subsidies was 
recognized during Uruguay Round GATT negotiations. Article 10.2 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture instructed WTO members to work toward disciplines to govern 
provisions of officially supported agricultural export credit programs. The Ministerial Decision 
on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Program on Least-
Developed and Food Importing Developing Countries also addressed the export credit issue, 
stating that “any agreement relating to agricultural export credits makes appropriate provision for 
differential treatment in favor of least developed and food importing countries (WTO 1995).”
2  
 
Negotiations on officially supported export credit for agriculture have ensued in the 
OECD rather than in the WTO. The OECD's December, 2000 deadline for a negotiated outcome 
on this issue was missed, and those negotiations continue. One issue in this process is whether 
the OECD is the appropriate forum in which to negotiate this issue, and whether an outcome in 
the OECD would be the basis for any future WTO agreement on this issue. While most OECD 
members have insisted that the OECD outcome be binding, the European Union has at times held 
the position that this issue must eventually be negotiated under WTO auspices. Developing 
country WTO members have also stressed that OECD outcomes cannot be forced on WTO 
members, since many of those countries are not members of the OECD, however this practice is 
largely a OECD country activity. 
 
OECD negotiations on officially supported export credits for trade in goods other than 
agricultural and military goods have a long history, and resulted in a new 1998 Arrangement on 
Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits (OECD 1998). Those guidelines are 
voluntary, and apply to loans greater than two years and less than either five or ten years in 
duration, depending on the good in question. Guidelines require a minimum 15 percent cash 
down payment, and minimum interest rates must be charged based on reference commercial 
interest reference rates (CIRRs) adjusted for country risk premiums. These disciplines seek to 
minimize the extent to which officially supported export credits can act as export subsidies, and 
try to ensure that the terms of these loans are similar to commercial terms. Since loans are often 
longer term loans for investment goods, minimum interest rates are set to reduce their subsidy 
element. 
 
Rude (2000) has argued that most existing agricultural export credit programs do not 
meet these OECD guidelines. Down payment requirements are not met, and interest rates are 
often below OECD minimums, since default risk is largely eliminated by government 
                                                 
2  Countries with the status of least-developed (designated as such by the United Nations) include: Angola, 
Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia. In 
addition, net food importing countries include: Barbados, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Tunisia, and Venezuela.  16   
guarantees. But most agricultural export credit programs are for a term of less than one year, so 
that these OECD guidelines typically are not applicable. The longer-term for goods other than 
agriculture is appropriate because they are often investment goods. Since trade in agricultural 
commodities generally involves consumption goods, and future income streams are not 
generated, longer-term credit is less appropriate. This is reflected in the typical design of existing 
programs, which support short-term credit arrangements. These shorter terms limit the extent to 
which the more favorable terms under officially supported export credit constitute subsidies. 
 
In support of the ongoing negotiations, the OECD (2000a) conducted an extensive survey 
on the use of officially export credit subsidies for agricultural commodities by its members, and 
issued a report on the extent and nature of existing programs. This information is far more up-to-
date than data that has been available to researchers analyzing this issue previously. The OECD 
report evaluates export credit programs for a wide range of commodities and estimates that the 
subsidy element of most programs is quite low. 
 
Export Credits as Subsidies 
Officially supported export credits can serve as subsidies if the terms of loans under those 
programs are more favorable than the terms which would have been available from private 
market conditions. For example, if the interest rate charged under the program does not 
adequately reflect country risk premiums, then a subsidy element from the program would be 
present. The extent of the subsidy depends on interest rates charged relative to market rates 
(appropriately reflecting risk), the fees charged, down payments required, and the term of the 
loan. The longer the term of the loan for a given interest rate, down payment, and fee structure, 
the greater is the subsidy element of the program. Since risk premiums reflect default risk (at 
least in theory), the subsidy element of programs which involve default risk guarantees can also 
be gauged by the extent to which government budgetary allocations are required to pay off 
guarantees.   
 
Several methodologies have been established to estimate the subsidy value of particular 
credit arrangements (Hyberg et al.1995; Raynaud 1992; Baron 1983; Baricello and Vercammen 
1994). These methodologies typically assume risk premiums in country specific market interest 
rates fully reflect default risks of loans, and are appropriate in gauging the value to importers of 
guarantees. A net present value calculation of the cost of the loan relative to the cost that would 
be incurred under market conditions is utilized to estimate the subsidy value. 
 
Establishing market interest rates to be used in the estimation of program subsidy values 
can be problematic. Market interest rates must reflect risk premiums associated with these loans, 
and Wilson et al. (1987) have argued that comparable short-term loans are not common. Current 
practice, including the methodology used by the OECD, as well as by Scully (1992) and Wilson 
and Yang (1996) have based importers’ market interest rates on that country’s Moody's rating (or 
an equivalent rating), and the interest rate which would typically apply to a borrower of that 
rating. 
 
One of the concerns with calculating the subsidy value is that in some cases importers 
might have been unable to obtain credit at any interest rate, corresponding to a situation 
described as a “liquidity constraint.” If liquidity constraints are binding for an importer, then the   17 
subsidy value of the officially supported export credit program could be substantially greater 
than the standard methodology calculates, but it is conceptually difficult to establish their value 
in such situations.  
In calculating the subsidy element of official credit programs, it would be useful to 
include all of the components of those programs. For example some programs include credit on 
transportation costs while other programs deal with exchange rate risk. Neither of these are 
treated in the standard methodology, nor were they addressed in the OECD's efforts to estimate 
subsidy values for existing credit programs. 
 
The alternative approach to estimate subsidy values, as used by the General Accounting 
Office (GAO 1995), and in WTO rules for export subsidy and producer support limitations, 
estimates the subsidy element of export credit programs as the extent of public monies expended 
to run the programs. For example, in the GAO's calculation of export subsidies under the 
Commodity Credit Corporation's GSM 102 and 103 programs, the subsidy was estimated as the 
payouts to cover defaults. This estimation of the subsidy value of the U.S. export credit program 
was somewhat higher than the OECD estimate (around 9 percent rather than 6.6 percent), 
reflecting the fact that default rates under this program have been higher than would be predicted 
by market based country risk premiums. 
 
The extent of subsidies are often expressed as a price subsidy equivalent of the export 
subsidy arrangement. Baron established the methodology for estimating that as the subsidy value 
as a fraction of export value. That method does not consider whether subsidies alter marginal 
costs or relieve budget constraints of importers. If export credit programs work through income 
rather than price effects, and create additional demand, this method will overstate the 
distortionary effects of this form of subsidy. 
 
Empirical Facts about Export Credits for Agriculture 
The OECD report describing the outcome of its survey provides the most up-to-date 
information on the extent and nature of officially supported export credit programs. This report 
indicates that the use of export credits expanded from $5.5 billion and 1995 to $7.9 billion in 
1998. These credits represented 3.6 percent of total agricultural exports in 1995 and increased to 
5.2 percent of agricultural exports in 1998. The expansion in use of officially supported export 
credits was likely to have been caused by deteriorating financial market conditions, especially 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The OECD report shows substantially different interest rates, 
and hence subsidy values for the beginning of 1998 versus the end of 1998, reflecting this 
continuing crisis. 
 
The OECD's estimate of the subsidy value for these programs in 1998 averaged 3.6 
percent of export value. There were only four countries for which subsidies exceeded one 
percent: 6.6 percent in the U.S., 3.8 percent in Norway, 3.8 percent in France, and 1.2 percent in 
Canada. Given these relatively small subsidies, the extent of distortions to trade patterns are 
likely also to be relatively small. 
 
Less than half of the loans offered under officially supported export credit programs are 
for a term of more than one year. Greater than 96 percent of loans for more than one year are 
from the United States. As a consequence, most of subsidy value estimated for these programs is 18   
from U.S. programs (88 percent). The European Union accounts for seven percent of credit 
subsidies, Canada accounts for 4 percent, and Australia accounts for one percent. Thus, export 
credits as subsidies is viewed as largely a U.S. problem. It should be noted, however, that since 
the 1995 Uruguay Round Agreement the United States has continued the use of export credits 
rather than direct export subsidies (such as Export Enhancement Payments), whereas the 
European Union has relied on direct export subsidies rather than credit subsidies. 
 
Bulk cereals are the most important commodity group subsidized. More than one-third of 
subsidies in 1996-97 went to cereals, and up to 14.5 percent (in 1997) of cereals exports received 
credit subsidies. However, officially supported export credit programs exist for a wide variety of 
commodities. The OECD also notes that most subsidized credits are applied to trade between 
OECD countries. The least developed countries received only 0.2 percent of export credits, and 
food importing developing countries receive only 8.9 percent of credits. The OECD concludes 
the disciplines on agricultural export credits would not greatly harm poorer food importing 
countries, because they have not historically been substantial beneficiaries of these programs. 
They suggest this is indirect evidence both that liquidity constraints for these countries are not 
being relieved, and the concerns raised in the Uruguay Round Agreement Ministerial Decision 
are moot. But this same study shows increasing use of export credits during the Asian financial 
crisis, when liquidity constraints were likely to be binding.  
 
Most research has focused on agricultural export credit programs that potentially 
subsidize international cereal trade (Dahl, Wilson, and Gustafson 1995a; Dahl, Wilson, and 
Gustafson 1995b). Thus, better descriptions are available for cereals programs, and little is 
known about the operational details for the other two-thirds of export credit programs. In the 
U.S., the Commodity Credit Corporation of the Foreign Agricultural Service in the U.S. 
Department Agriculture offers credit guarantees through GSM 102 and 103. Those programs 
provide government guarantees on private loans. The U.S. also offers export credit for cereals as 
part of its food aid program – Title I of Public Law 480. The aid element of that program is due 
in part to the concessional terms on loans. In Canada, the Canadian Wheat Board offers a Credit 
Guarantee Sales Program through the AgriFood Credit Facility. In Australia, the Export Finance 
Insurance Corporation provides insurance on private loans. In France, the Company for 
International Trade Insurance  — COFACE, a semiprivate entity that may not be included in the 
OECD study  — insures loans on cereals trade. In each of these programs, the most important 
subsidy derives from the guarantee against default risk offered to private lenders. Typically, 
interest rates charged then do not include a risk premium, providing a substantial cost saving to 
the importer. 
 
Issues of Concern for Negotiations 
Research on officially supported agricultural export credits has raised and examined 
several issues. These issues relate to the extent to which export credit programs contain 
subsidies, the extent to which those subsidies distort trade, and how disciplines of credit 
programs would limit those distortions. Understanding these issues should condition any 
negotiations concerning disciplines on these programs. 
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Additionality or Market Share? 
If export credits contain subsidies, by making the terms of one exporter more favorable 
than those of another, they may shift market share to that exporter in the manner similar to a 
direct price subsidy. However, export credits may relax importer budget constraints rather than 
changing marginal prices on transactions, and so may shift demand for a commodity outward. 
The extent to which export credit programs expand demand rather than compete for market share 
is addressed in the issue labeled “additionality.” Additionality was better defined when applied to 
the food aid debate in the 1960-1980s than it appears to be now in much of the research on 
export credit programs. This latter research utilizes a vague definition relating additionality to 
any imports associated with an export credit program. In the food aid debate there was explicit 
attention to determining the extent to which credit programs expand demand (Fisher 1963). This 
concern has been raised in some recent literature on export credit programs as well as export 
subsidies (Paarlberg 1999), who notes that export credits might better be represented as income 
subsidies rather than price subsidies. If an income subsidy expands demand, it can potentially 
raise the world price and benefit all exporters. Price subsidies are more likely to lower the price 
received by competing exporters, and so distort trade more. The mechanism by which export 
credits could expand demand and improve welfare for all exporters is similar to the way in which 
targeted agricultural export subsidies expand demand and at the same time potentially raise 
world price and producer welfare (Abbott, Paarlberg, and Sharples 1987). If export credit 
programs create additional demand, disciplining them is unlikely to benefit either competing 
exporters or importers. The standard practice of treating export credits as a price subsidy 
equivalent is also likely to overstate the extent to which they distort trade. 
 
Liquidity Constraints 
One of the reasons why researchers believe export credit programs can expand demand is 
because they believe that at times agricultural importers may face liquidity constraints. Countries 
may lack sufficient foreign exchange to import desired foodstuffs, and under certain market 
conditions may be unable to obtain credit on any terms. In periods of financial crisis, such as the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997, or when developing countries face financial crises leading to the 
need for structural adjustment programs, binding foreign exchange constraints may limit food 
imports. If officially supported export credit programs permit short-term loans to be made when 
no credit would otherwise be available, then they enable imports which would not have 
otherwise occurred. In this case those imports are additional to those which would have occurred 
in the absence of the program, and world market demand has been expanded. In such cases the 
methodology used by OECD underestimates the subsidy equivalent of a publicly supported 
export credit program. The larger subsidy would not disadvantage other exporters since it is 
likely to create additional demand.  
      
The standard procedure for estimating the subsidy value of agricultural export credits 
does not consider the possibility of liquidity constraints. The subsidy element is largely 
determined by the difference between market interest rates adjusted for the country risk premium 
and interest rates under official programs. Establishing those market interest rates is problematic, 
as noted above, and some evidence cited here suggests those market interest rates may be 
underestimated. The subsidy element also strongly depends on the term of the loan. Subsidy 
components become larger as the term for the loan is longer. Since agricultural commodities are 
consumption goods, justification for longer-term loans is weak, and when the term is longer than 20   
a year, suspicion that the credit program involves a subsidy is high. Only the U.S. offers a 
substantial amount of agricultural export credit for a term longer than one year. 
 
Who Benefits? 
In order to meet their goals, officially supported export credit programs must be 
structured so that recipient countries, not banks, capture the benefits. If WTO disciplines include 
setting interest rates at full market levels (i.e., not subsidized) then researchers have argued that 
that banks are likely to benefit rather than importers. The possibility of the export credit program 
generating additional demand would be lost as it is unlikely that liquidity constraints would be 
relaxed.  
 
Linkages to STEs and Food Aid 
Issues related to additionality derived from officially supported export credits, and 
implications of institutional arrangements on the nature of subsidy provided, hence the extent of 
trade distortions, are also relevant to other forms of export subsidies, including state trading, 
food aid and direct export subsidies. State traders may make loans. If those loan terms are more 
favorable than commercial terms, that practice constitutes an export subsidy, and yet the lack of 
transparency of operations by state traders may make that practice hard to detect. Some food aid 
is also given as loans rather than as grants, although there is pressure under food aid conventions 
to convert terms to grants rather than loans. To the extent that terms under a food aid loan are 
concessional, and yield a grant component, those credit terms may constitute a subsidy derived 
from an export credit program similar to those discussed above. A more difficult problem with 
food aid, and for foreign aid more generally, concerns tied aid. Under some foreign aid 
programs, recipients of “tied-aid” may be required to purchase export commodities from the 
donor. To the extent that that foreign aid is given as concessional loans rather than grants, the 
tied-aid constitutes a subsidy on those exports from the donor. The OECD negotiations are 
explicitly considering disciplining this practice. The overlap of these practices is likely to be of 
concern in establishing any rules governing export subsidies more generally, and food aid in 
particular. 
 
Empirical Research on Export Credits 
Beyond the OECD study cited above, most research by agricultural economists on credit 
programs has focused on the cereals programs cited above for the United States, Canada, France, 
and Australia, and has examined wheat trade more than trade in other commodities. The general 
finding of those studies is that export credits have increased demand for agricultural 
commodities. The programs are effective in expanding demand, if expensive. Data constraints 
have limited research in this area. Relatively few empirical studies have been conducted, and 
those that are available generally used data on credit programs prior to 1995, before adoption of 
the Uruguay Round Agreement. 
 
The standard practice for estimating the trade distorting effects of export credit subsidies 
has been to follow Baron’s procedure and then to treat export credits programs as a price subsidy 
equivalent. These price equivalent subsidies are introduced into market simulation models to 
estimate the distortionary effects of credit programs. But recent studies have found that credit 
programs, EEP subsidies, and direct price subsidies have quantitatively different impacts on 
trade, suggesting that credit subsidies may act differently from price subsidies (Koo and Karema   21 
1991; Diersen 1997; Wilson and Yang 1996). Therefore, income effects rather than price effects 
may be driving trade impacts from export credit programs, so that additionality rather than (or in 
addition to) competition for market share is the more likely consequence. Also, credit programs 
may be relieving liquidity constraints, something that authors in this area believe could be 
important. 
 
As noted above, the General Accounting Office has also measured the subsidy value and 
cost of U.S. agricultural export credit programs. Their approach bases subsidy estimates on 
budgetary outlays under programs and is more consistent with existing WTO rules. It also avoids 
the problems of estimating country risk premiums and corresponding market interest rates that 
would apply to loans under these programs. Moreover, it finds greater subsidy value for those 
programs due to the relatively high default rates under the United States GSM programs. The 
practice of estimating subsidies based on program outlays, and disciplining the use of 
government budgetary allocations to such programs, is likely to be more easily implemented in 
the context of WTO negotiations. To the extent that credit programs offer subsidies they are 
likely to generate costs to the government. Moreover, default risk may be enhanced by 
participation in these programs, so country risk premiums are a lower bound on that cost.  
 
The GAO has recognized that disciplining government budgetary costs of officially 
supported export credit programs may be infeasible, since programs cannot control the actual 
default rates experienced. Other WTO disciples on agricultural trade, notably export subsidy and 
producer support limitations, are also potentially infeasible, since governments cannot control 
the world market conditions which determine program expenditures. Such limitations are 
practical, in that program scope and parameters are altered when conditions cause spending to  
approach or exceed commitments, as is the case for the EU Agenda 2000 reforms, which are in 
part intended to insure that the EU remains within its WTO commitments. 
 
Negotiating Positions  
Differences of opinion appear to remain on whether or not this issue can be resolved 
within the OECD or must be part of a new WTO agreement. National positions appear to be in 
flux on this concern. The European Union had wanted negotiations to go to the WTO, but 
became more accepting of an OECD outcome as the December 2000 deadline neared. Non-
OECD members, however, want negotiations on export credit issues to be explicitly part of 
agricultural negotiations now continuing under the WTO. Developing countries are especially 
concerned about being disenfranchised by the OECD process. 
 
The export credit issue is most explicitly evident in the European Union negotiating 
position in the WTO on agricultural export subsidies. Their position paper explicitly states that 
export subsidy negotiations must address the export credit issue, as well as other forms of 
implicit and indirect subsidies.  
 
The CAIRNS group includes Canada and Australia, two countries that historically 
utilized state trading agencies and have offered export credit programs through those agencies. 
Hence, the position of the CAIRNS group on export credits is brief, and some dissension exists 
within the group. The official position is that the term length for export credits should be limited 
to one year. It was interesting to note that in our discussions with the Australian agricultural 
representative in Washington D.C. on this issue that limiting the term of programs was their most 22   
important concern, and the question of interest rates under programs never came up. Both the OECD 
evidence and analysis of programs suggests that limiting the terms of loans appears to be a sufficient 
means for substantially disciplining the subsidy component of any officially supported agricultural 
export credit program. 
 
The U.S. position on export credits is mostly devoted to linking this issue to state trading. It 
asks that any loans by state traders be classified as officially supported export credit and so be 
reported to the WTO as well as subject to WTO disciplines. The United States appears reluctant to 
give up its export credit programs and would prefer not to discuss them in WTO negotiations, rather 
addressing them in the OECD. Evidently, the United States has indicated a willingness to reduce it's 
term length for its export credit programs to 18 months, but balks at constraining the term to one 
year. This, after all, is the most important export subsidy-like program pursued by the United States 
following Uruguay Round GATT agreement. 
 
Conclusions on Export Credits 
The estimated subsidy value of existing programs is generally very low. Only for U.S. 
programs are subsidy values above four percent, and credit terms are longer than one year. In all 
cases, these relatively low subsidies are likely to induce only small trade distortions. Evidence from 
the literature suggests that these programs may create additional demand, and to the extent that this is 
true their negative impact on competing exporters are minimal. 
 
Disciplining officially supported export credit programs is more likely to be accomplished by 
limiting the term of loans offered, and by constraining government budgetary outlays for programs, 
rather than by constraining program parameters such as minimum interest rate requirements. This 
political compromise is likely to adequately limit the extent of implicit subsidies from credit. 
Constraining interest rates or other program parameters risks interfering with commercial 
relationships, may negate the value of the program to the importers, and limit additionality.  
 
Difficult issues arise where credit programs overlap other forms of subsidies, such as food 
aid. Special and differential treatment of credit programs for developing countries is mandated in the 
Uruguay Round Agreement and could more effectively target relief of liquidity constraints and 








5. STATE TRADING 
 
Summary of Current Situation 
State trading is used in a variety of forms by both importers and exporters of agricultural 
commodities. The primary function of these agencies is to implement domestic agricultural 
policy. In doing so these agencies must address multiple and conflicting goals including producer 
support, consumer subsidization, marketing system efficiency, and the exercise of market power 
in both domestic and international markets (Table 3).  
 
Box 2: Export Credit Options for Reform 
§ Limit the term length of export credits; 
§ Limit government budgetary outlays for export credits; and 
§ Consider differential treatment for developing countries. 
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Table 3. Conflicting Objectives of State Trading Enterprises 
 
   Market Power (Exercise or Control) 
 
   International Market   
  Optimal tariffs, taxes and subsidies 
  Price discrimination 
  Countervailing negotiating power 
 
   Domestic Market   
  Collect rents from market position 
  Prevent distortions from private agents 
 
   Policy Objectives 
 
   Income Redistribution   
  Producer support and farm income 
  Consumer subsidization 
 
   Sectoral Policy   
  Price stabilization 
  Food security 
  Efficient market functioning 
 
   Foreign Policy   
  Meet WTO commitments 
  Supply sourcing based on politics 
 
 
The definition of STEs is hotly debated, largely because many variations exist. The 
definition is important because it determines which countries must notify the WTO that a 
particular agency is a state trader and so is subject to WTO disciplines. Three issues arise in 
establishing a definition  — ownership, special privileges of the government entity, and whether 
the state trader must make purchases and sales of the commodity (Ackerman and Dixit 1999). 
Differences of opinion exist about whether certain institutions are state traders. The Commodity 
Credit Corporation (CCC) of the U.S. was initially notified as a state trader in 1995, yet when the 
U.S. stopped utilizing EEP subsidies it withdrew its notification, although it may be argued that 
it continued acting as a state trader due to other programs (such as DEIP). Sorenson (1991) has 
argued that EU control of agricultural markets constitutes state trading, but since no public entity 
physically handles commodities, it has never been notified as a state trader. Thus, the WTO 
definition of state trading is narrower than simply including all public entities that can influence 
trade. 
 
Some WTO members are concerned with state trading because market activities by state 
traders may not be transparent and so countries utilizing state trading may not abide by their 
WTO commitments. State traders may be able to subsidize exports in a disguised manner and so 24   
exceed export subsidy commitments. It is also alleged that the privileged status of an STE may 
permit implicit subsidization of exports. Advantageous access to finance, preferential tax 
treatment, and the ability to negotiate long-term trade agreements are all examples of advantages 
of state traders which derive from their privileged status as public institutions. 
 
 Importing state traders may be able to protect markets beyond their tariff reduction 
commitments to the WTO. STEs may also not behave like private firms in international markets, 
violating other commitments to the WTO such as non-discrimination and equal treatment of 
trading partners, as when politics influences import market share.  
 
This discussion of state trading focuses on exporting STEs due to our concern with export 
competition. Importing STEs are briefly examined as WTO disciplines are likely to affect both  
importers and exporters.  
 
State Trading Under the WTO  
State trading is explicitly permitted under WTO rules. State traders have historically been 
required to notify GATT, and currently the WTO, of their existence. Until the Uruguay Round 
Agreement reporting requirements were minimal and many countries failed to notify agencies 
which were clearly state traders. Article XVII of the Uruguay Round Agreement established a 
working party to address state trading issues. Out of that effort came stricter notification 
requirements including a more detailed questionnaire and a new definition of state trading. The 
URAA continues to explicitly permit state trading. 
 
The new definition established by the WTO addresses the three issues raised above. The 
definition is “Any governmental and nongovernmental enterprises, including marketing boards, 
which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including statutory or 
constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases or sales the 
level or direction of imports or exports” (OECD 1998). 
 
A broad interpretation of ownership criterion, explicitly recognizing marketing boards as 
STEs, is part of this definition. The definition also explicitly notes the importance of special 
rights or privileges granted to STEs, and requires that state traders are able to influence trade 
through purchase and sales, hence requiring that STEs physically handle the commodity.  
 
Obligations under the WTO of state trading agencies include: 
 
•  Nondiscrimination: commonly referred to as most favored nation (MFN) treatment; 
•  No quantitative restrictions; 
•  Preservation of tariff concessions; 
•  Transparency; and that  
•  Sales be made in accordance with commercial practices. 
 
Governments are also obligated to meet their export subsidy commitments under the URAA 
in cases where STEs export a commodity. 
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The United States has been the most vocal advocate for reform of state trading. Its 
position at the end of the Uruguay Round was that this institution should be eliminated. 
Recognizing the broad support for this institution, the United States has modified its position, 
emphasizing a need for greater transparency and elimination of the exercise of market power by 
STEs. A recent institutional innovation for many STEs, strongly supported by the United States, 
is the coexistence of an STE with private traders, so that the state no longer has monopoly 
control over either imports or exports. The United States and other WTO members have 
expressed concern that many of the potential new entrants to the WTO use STEs extensively to 
implement agricultural policy. They argue that continued use of STEs makes it difficult to 
ascertain if WTO commitments are being upheld.  
 
The Prevalence of STEs 
Thirty countries have notified the WTO of the existence of nearly 100 state trading 
enterprises. Because of differing interpretations and ambiguities in definition it is likely that not 
all STEs have been notified to the WTO. STEs are generally found for politically sensitive 
commodities  — grains, sugar, and dairy. This commodity coverage reflects the importance of 
domestic agricultural policy objectives as the raison d’être for this institution.  
 
The prevalence of STEs has been declining. While nearly 90 percent of both rice and 
wheat trade in 1970s were handled by state traders (Schmitz et al 1981; Falcon and Monke 1979-
1980) that share has fallen to between 33 and 50 percent today (Abbott and Young 1999; Young 
1999). The decline in STEs is largely due to requirements of structural adjustment programs. The 
redistributional objectives of these agencies are costly, both in terms of domestic resources and 
foreign exchange, and were factors behind the macroeconomic imbalances that led to structural 
adjustment programs. Cost and pressure from international institutions prompted reform of these 
institutions more often than a change in the domestic agricultural policy goals held by these 
countries. Many Asian countries avoided structural adjustment programs imposed by the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund through better management of debt and foreign 
exchange and so less reform occurred in that region. To date, the WTO has had very little to do 
with reform or elimination of STEs. 
 
Countries have resisted the elimination of STEs as they are used to implement domestic 
policy. A common reform has been to permit private trading entities to coexist with public 
agencies. In some cases importing STEs will continue to manage a lower quality product 
targeted for poor consumer subsidization, while private agents handle trade for the higher quality 
products. The coexistence of private traders with STEs is likely to lead to a reduction in the 
potential monopoly power of the state trader. However, the state trader may retain certain special 
privileges. Reform of STEs has also been accomplished through privatization of existing entities, 
so that the STEs have autonomy from the government. An example of this is the reform of the 
Australian Wheat Board. These agencies become similar to producer cooperatives, and may be 
required to operate without government subsidization.  
 
Issues of Concern for Negotiations 
Definition 
Concern continues over the interpretation of the definition of an STE because some 
countries have not notified agencies considered to be STEs. Several researchers have questioned 26   
whether the legal definitions hold economic significance. One of the lessons from the literature is 
that institutions evolve as they reform in order to continue to achieve important domestic 
objectives. For example, simply because the ownership status of an STE changes does not imply 
a lower level of protection (Abbott and Young 1999). It is important to remember that state 
trading, with the requirement to physically handle grain, is not the only means by which 
governments can influence price or quantity at their borders. 
    
Market Power 
The power held by state traders in their domestic and in international markets is of 
concern to many governments, and is frequently mentioned in WTO position statements. State 
traders may regulate domestic prices, enact supply controls, and regulate procurement and 
domestic marketing. Several researchers have noted that the ability of the state trader to distort 
trade results from the combination of control over the domestic market and whether or not the 
STE is large in international markets and so may be able to exercise some degree of market 
power (Dixit and Josling 1997; Ackerman and Dixit 1999; Veeman, Fulton, and Larue 1999).  
 
Only a very few of the many state traders have sufficient market share to significantly 
alter world prices. Table 4 lists the largest exporting and importing STEs, indicating the 
commodities they trade as well as the magnitude of their operations. Only two exporting STEs 
have a market share greater than 10 percent, and another six hold market shares in excess of 5 
percent. No importing STE holds a market share in excess of 10 percent, and only three 
importers hold market shares above 5 percent. Relatively low market shares lead to the 
conclusion that concern with the exercise of market power by these entities may be misplaced. If 
products are differentiated, or if markets are highly segmented, the market power of these entities 
may be greater. It should be remembered that implementation of domestic policies by small 
country STEs lacking market power, however, can also alter trade patterns much in the same 
way that small traders can reduce imports with tariffs or NTBs. 
 
The CWB has received the bulk of attention by researchers examining exporting STEs 
and several studies find evidence of market power exercised by the CWB in international 
markets, and that CWB export sales command premiums. Some researchers attribute that entirely 
to market power, while others conclude that Canada exports higher quality wheat, and so 
premiums reflect quality differentials. 
 
Importers have argued that that STEs are necessary to maintain countervailing market 
power in situations where markets are segmented and they face large exporting entities. In 
addition, exporting and importing STEs can exhibit economies of scale in trade. The institutional 
arrangements for export subsidies, such as EEP subsidies, have also been a justification for 
maintaining STEs so that government to government negotiations can establish subsidy levels.  
Table 4.  State Trading Agencies in International Agricultural Markets* 
 
 






Share (%)**           
Large Exporters   
Canadian Wheat Board 
New Zealand Dairy Board (export monopoly under negotiation) 
Australian Wheat Board 
COFCO (China)***   
Queensland Sugar Corp. (Australia) 
New S. Wales Rice Marketing Board (Australia) 
South African Deciduous Fruit Board 
New Zealand Kiwifruit Board   
Soil Products Office (Turkey) 
South African Maize Board 
New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board (revoked 10/2001) 









































Large Importers   
COFCO (China)* 




Japan Tobacco Agency 
Korean Livestock Marketing Board 
Ministry of Food (Pakistan) 
CONASUPO (Mexico) 
Tunisian Grain Board 
National Sugar and Tea Office (Morocco) 
Bernas (Malaysia) 
 
Wheat, Corn, Rice, Oils 
Wheat, Rice, Barley 




































         
* This table is adapted from Ackerman and Dixit (1999), who report STEs and their import or export commodities and values, typically for 1993-95. 
** World market share is export or import value, from Ackerman and Dixit, divided by total world trade value for the commodities managed, from FAOs AGROSTAT database. 




Since market conduct may be difficult to assess, contestability has been suggested as a 
criterion for judging whether the exercise of market power by an STE is truly a relevant concern 
(Veeman, Fulton, and Larue 1999). Markets are contestable when the possibility of market entry 
preclude the exercise of market power, even though market share might suggests market power 
might exist. Veeman, Fulton and Larue use contestability and other criteria to classify state 
traders into green, amber and red categories, with a higher level of disciplines, largely through 
increased reporting requirements, proposed for STEs in the red category.  
 
 One of innovations with state trading aimed at elimination of power over the domestic 
market is to require that an STE coexist with private traders. In the case of exporters, producers 
may then have a choice about whether to use the STE or a private company to market their grain. 
The loss of an STE in the export market may result in a loss of competition by reducing the 
number of sellers in some markets.  
   
In some cases, producers question whether or not they are well served by state trading 
agencies that control a variety of aspects of marketing. A vigorous internal debate continues 
within Canada concerning whether or not farmers are well served by this institution, and many 
studies have examined the marketing costs and efficiency of the Canadian Wheat Board (Carter 
and Loyns 1996; Kraft, Furtan, and Tyrchniewicz 1996; Schmitz, Furtan, Brooks, and Gray 
1997). 
 
The reform of STEs may difficult for developing countries whose infrastructure is unable 
to support a competitive private sector fulfilling the many roles of importing and distributing 
agricultural and food products. Tangermann and Josling (1999, pg. 25) note that “For some time 
to come, parastatals may therefore still have a place in developing country food trade and 
marketing in order to provide stability, administer nutritional programs and prevent the abuse of 
market power by private firms. This is another case where ‘special and differential treatment’ 
may play an important role.” 
 
Josling (1998) suggests that state trading be considered as a part of broader WTO 
discussions on competition policy, and applying goals to ensure that governments operate in 
contestable markets may be the appropriate long term goal for the trading system. However, 
Abbott (1998) notes STEs have traditionally been exempted from competition policy discipline. 
For non-agricultural commodities the trade-off between market power and competition with 
economies of scale has been resolved by permitting competition to be compromised when the 
public interest is served. That justification suggests competition policy, even if further developed 
by the WTO, is unlikely to be rigorously applied to agricultural STEs. 
 
Transparency 
Lack of transparency is the most often voiced concern with state trading enterprises. If 
the public agency handles imports or exports, it can either disguise the level of protection, and so 
avoid tariff reduction commitments, or it can subsidize exports in a manner difficult to measure. 
While disguised protection generates rents equivalent to tariff revenue, export subsidies either 
require government budgetary support or some form of cross-subsidization or price   29 
discrimination to finance the subsidy. The problem is a more general one as lack of transparency 
confounds the investigation or discipline of export subsidies in general, as well as other practices 
providing implicit subsidies, such as officially supported export credit. One solution to this 
problem is elimination of the institution in favor of more transparent alternatives. A more 
transparent public institution which does not physically handle grain, but which makes public 
information on terms of terms of trade, could improve transparency. An example is the 
Commodity Credit Corporation, which reports transaction information. However, widespread use 
of STEs makes their elimination unlikely in the current negotiations. Abandoning STEs in favor 
of private traders does not insure an increase in transparency as private traders are not required to 
disclose information on cross subsidization or price discrimination, and it is widely recognized 
that private traders may engage in these practices.  
 
An alternative solution is that notifications to WTO require that these institutions give 
sufficient information to insure that commitments are met. The WTO has recently (during the 
drafting of this paper) implemented revised notification requirements that require a substantial 
degree of notification (WTO 2001b), including description of the operation of the STEs and 
annual data. Data required includes yearly average import price, representative domestic sales 
and  procurement prices, mark ups, export prices, as well as volume information. This data 
should assist in the detection of potentially disguised export subsidies.  
 
Consideration of more detailed reporting requirements need to balance an STE's need to 
compete with the private sector, and the concern of other agricultural exporters that STEs may 
engage in price discrimination beyond that which is possible by the private trade, dump or 
engage in cross-subsidization of commodities. Requiring STEs to report, on a regular basis, the 
transactions level data necessary to detect these practices would greatly exceed the level of 
notification currently in use in other areas. STEs compete with private firms, and, depending on 
the commodity, they may also compete with other STEs. As Veeman, Fulton and Larue note “It 
would not be in the spirit of GATT/WTO to impose higher reporting requirements on a STE than 
those that are customarily applicable to its competitors in any market. Such a requirement would 
place the STE at a competitive disadvantage” (1999, pg.31). 
 
Perhaps a balance between the needs of STE’s to protect market information and concern 
over their ability to circumvent their GATT commitments is met through a nation’s ability to 
press a complaint through the WTO dispute resolution system. A complaint is most likely to 
arise from observations on the part of private trade, who are informed observers of the market,  
and who suspect that commitments are being violated. The investigating process then requests 
data needed to evaluate the complaint.  
 
Price Discrimination 
One of the mechanisms by which STEs may distort markets is to price discriminate, or to 
sell exports to different countries at different prices. This practice allows subsidization of sales to 
lower priced markets, in principle without net government budgetary support, as well as the 
exercise of market power in a manner that increases producer income, and raises national welfare 
of the exporter. This is an example where the institutional innovation, state trading, resolves the 
conflict between producer support and the exercise of market power (Abbott and Young 2000). 
Pooling is another institutional innovation that is argued to enable price discrimination.  30   
 
Pooling 
One of the most hotly debated issues related to STE behavior is whether or not “pooling,” 
a common practice of some of the large grain trading STEs, enables export subsidies. Pooling 
occurs when a state trader purchases commodities from farmer an undetermined price and 
returns net revenue to producers at a later time, after sales have occurred, allowing pooling of 
receipts to all farmers across multiple sales. With pooling cross-subsidization can occur overtime 
and across commodities. When state traders handle multiple commodities, and especially when 
state traders control joint products, as in the case of dairy, prices can be altered for each product 
to maximize net profit of the board, or achieve whatever objective the STE is pursuing. It is 
argued that pooling and cross subsidization enable greater “discretionary pricing” by state traders 
than is possible by private firms.   
 
Much of the work on agricultural export subsidies has examined price discrimination 
because that is how export subsidies have been implemented in practice and these issues have 
already been discussed in Section 3. In that work, price pooling and other forms of cross-
subsidization have been investigated as vehicles for facilitating discrimination. It is alleged that 
STEs utilize price discrimination and cross subsidization to implicitly subsidize exports. Work 
on export subsidization by the CWB often focuses on these practices. Whether the privileged 
status of an STE more easily permits implicit subsidies is another issue receiving attention. 
 
Pooling and price discrimination need to be treated as somewhat independent problems, 
however. It is possible to price discriminate in the absence of pooling, and pooling does not 
automatically imply price discrimination. Moreover, there is evidence that private firms engage 
in discriminatory pricing. Pooling is principally a vehicle intended to help farmers cope with 
risk. Other institutions exist in different countries as alternative mechanisms for coping with risk, 
including domestic support policies, future markets and insurance schemes in the United States. 
Even under the CWB, alternatives to price pooling are emerging (such as the fixed-price 




Whatever is done in the WTO to deal with STEs will concern both importers and 
exporters. Specific issues focused mostly on importing STE behavior include whether or not 
STEs allocate market share according to commercial considerations, whether they can avoid 
WTO commitments and achieve higher levels of protection, and whether specific institutional 
arrangements, such as TRQs administered by STEs, can exacerbate these concerns. 
 
If STEs allocate market share based on political considerations, they do not behave 
according to commercial practices and violate nondiscrimination (MFN) requirements of the 
WTO. Weak evidence suggests there may be some difference in the determination of market 
share, with private trade regimes more responsive to market forces than state trading agencies. 
Lack of transparency in their operations can make this practice difficult to detect. 
 
Research has also found that agricultural policy objectives often outlive state trading 
enterprises. That is, protection levels are often more dependent on world price than on the   31 
institutions through which protection is achieved (Abbott and Young 1999). This is a 
consequence of the stabilization objective, which persists as an important goal. No significant 
difference in protection levels have been found, either between countries where state trading is 
practiced and where it is not, and more importantly before and after reforms of this institution. It 
is probably more effective to regulate behaviors in international markets than to eliminate 
particular institutions. 
 
Some new state trading agencies emerged following the Uruguay Round Agreement to 
implement TRQs. A general finding is that since TRQs can act like quotas and so generate rents, 
administration mechanisms often seek to allocate those rents to domestic producer groups in one 
fashion or another. Once again, domestic objectives dominate. Since TRQs can act like quotas, 
they can limit contestability in markets.  
 
TRQ administration has been seen as a vehicle for implementing disguised protection. 
But a survey of the administration of TRQs in developing countries (Abbott and Morse 2000) 
found that when STEs administer TRQs, underfill has occurred substantially less often than 
under other arrangements, and overfill  — imports in excess of minimum access commitments  
— is a common outcome. Abbott and Morse (1999) also argue that an endogenous quota regime 
may apply, and may explain this outcome. The STE determines imports based on national needs 
(demand), and has set minimum access commitments well below likely needs. Imports are often 
in excess of the minimum access commitment, and yet higher tariffs are not applied. It is also 
common for STEs administering quotas to coexist with private traders, with the STE managing 
low tariff imports.   
 
Negotiating Positions  
Within the context of WTO negotiations, the reform or elimination of state trading 
agencies has largely been a U.S. concern. The current U.S. position on reform of state trading 
agencies includes the following actions: 
 
§ End exclusive import or export rights to ensure private sector competition in markets 
controlled by single desk traders; 
§ Establish WTO requirements for single desk exporters to notifying acquisition costs, export 
pricing and other sales information; and to 
§ Eliminate the use of government funds or guarantees to support or ensure the financial 
viability of STEs. 
 
Japan argues that exporting STEs have not been disciplined to the same extent as importing 
STEs and advocates for: 
§ Quarterly notification of the amount and price of exports, the procurement price and so forth; 
§ Prohibition of financial assistance from the government; and  
§ A contribution to the stabilization of the international market through, for example, 
obligating minimum exports and stockholding in preparation for unforeseen circumstances.  
 
The EU position argues that cross-subsidization and price pooling, and other unspecified 
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acquisition costs and export pricing, and that disciplines to limit the anti-competitive effect of 
STEs be enacted. The EU does not call for the elimination of STEs. 
 
MERCOSUR, Chile and Columbia also called for disciplining the activities of 
governmental and non-governmental enterprises and marketing boards that benefit from 
monopoly import or export rights. 
 
Canada has argued in an OECD paper that contestability is the appropriate criterion for 
determining whether an STE has market power and so can distort trade. Since they believe on the 
basis of this criterion the CWB does not have significant market power, and so does not distort 
trade, they argue against the need for disciplining this institution. 
  
Options for Reform and Conclusions 
At this point the position papers advanced for negotiations reflect a desire to discipline, 
but not to eliminate state trading enterprises. Disciplines that are likely to be discussed in 
negotiations include increased notification requirements on the part of STEs and efforts to reduce 
or prevent their exercise of market power. To date, most proposals have lacked specific detail on 
notification requirements or market power disciplines, making it impossible to assess the actual 
ramifications of these disciplines in practice. 
 
STEs are an institution in many countries that are charged with achieving a broad set of 
domestic policy goals. To the extent that domestic constituencies support these goals there can 
be high political costs associated with national governments being forced to abandon these 
institutions.
3 In some observed cases the outcome of the politically costly process of reform has 
been the implementation of new methods to achieve the same domestic policy goals. In some 
other cases, private monopolies have entered the market so that concerns with market power, 
transparency and price discrimination have not been alleviated. If this occurs, any rents from 
market power have been captured by private firms, and are not passed on to producers.  
 
The difficulties in effectively disciplining state trading are evident by the lack of concrete 
proposals from the United States government who has expressed concern over this institution 
since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations, in 1994. State trading plays an 
important role in implementing domestic policy goals for many countries; state trading is not 
likely to have a large impact on international markets; and reform is not likely to result in greater 
competition. Negotiations should focus on restricting government support and evaluation of if 
mechanisms currently embodied in the dispute resolution system are adequate for investigating  
possible violations by STEs of their countries GATT commitments. Recommendations for 
negotiations are summarized in Box 3. 
                                                 
3 In the Canadian case support exists on the part of some Canadian producers for elimination of the Canadian Wheat 
Board.  











6. FOOD AID 
 
Summary of Current Situation 
Food aid is used to alleviate hunger due to the occurrence of natural disasters or political 
unrest. Food aid is also used in a wide variety of development projects such as food-for-work in 
agricultural projects, and human resource projects including school feeding, health and nutrition 
programs. Food aid programs began in the 1950s due to the simultaneous existence of 
agricultural surpluses in the United States and Canada and both sporadic and systemic food 
shortages in many developing countries. Since the 1950s other countries have become important 
food aid donors, and donors differ in the importance of humanitarian, producer support and 
political objectives in their food aid programs. 
 
A mix of national and multilateral agencies provide food aid. The United States continues 
to be the largest donor of food aid, and in the 1990s provided 40 to 60 percent of total donations. 
Multilateral agencies delivered 28 to 42 percent of food aid since 1994. Almost all multilateral 
food aid is delivered through the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP 2000). Cereal 
food aid averaged less than 0.5 percent of world cereal production, or around 9 percent of cereal 
imports by low-income food deficit countries (WFP 2000). Actual deliveries of food aid are 
illustrated in Figure 2 and exhibit a great deal of variability. Food aid was nearly 13 million 
metric tons (mmt) in 1994, declined to 7.2 mmt in 1996, and doubled to 14.5 mmt in 1999. 
While an increasing variety of foods are used as food aid, cereals continue to account for around 
87 percent of total food aid.  
 
Food aid has become a concern for WTO negotiations because food aid levels increase in 
periods of surplus, and decline when there are shortages in world markets. Also, food aid can be 
used as an export subsidy. Tying food aid receipts to commercial imports would be a blatant 
export subsidy, and was forbidden in the URAA. The extent to which food aid in practice may be 




Box 3: State Trading Options for Reform 
§ Consider market power issues in the context of broader competition policy; 
§ Evaluate if the current WTO dispute resolution system is adequate to investigate 
violation of commitments by STEs; 
§ If further disciplines are enacted consider differential treatment for developing 
countries. 
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Source: FAO  
Note:   FAO and WFP data on total food aid shipments varies to a degree. FAO data is used for this graph as 
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The importance of agricultural surpluses in food aid programs has presented a problem 
for both donors and recipients. As donors are largely agricultural exporters, their concern has 
been to use surpluses as food aid and to deliver food aid in a manner that would minimize 
disruption to world markets. In 1954, the Consultative Subcommittee of Surplus Disposal of the 
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization was charged with developing protocols for food aid 
with the goal of achieving minimal disruption to commercial agricultural trade. 
  
For recipients, the importance of surplus disposal in donor food aid programs has resulted 
in less food aid during times of global food shortage when prices are high and stocks are low 
(Figure 3). In short, the delivery of food aid has been, and to some extent continues to be, greatly 
influenced by availability. The first food aid convention was negotiated in 1967 in an attempt to 
better address recipient needs. The Food Aid Convention (FAC) is a forum in which donors 
commit to provide a minimum amount of food aid for a specified period of time, and the 1967 
convention guaranteed minimum donor commitments of 4.5 mmt of food aid. This minimum 
commitment rose to 7.5 mmt in 1986, although actual donations have exceeded minimum 
commitments in many years. In 1999, donors to the FAC decreased their pledged commitment to 
4.8 mmt, the lowest level since the initiation of the program 33 years earlier (Figure 2). It should 
be borne in mind that actual donations were nearly three times commitments in this year when 
there were substantial surpluses. Current donor obligations under the FAC are in terms of tons of 
food, not dollars, which should assist in maintaining minimum food aid levels regardless of 
cereal prices in the future. However, in recent years the United States has continued its historical 
pattern of increasing its food aid donations when wheat and other cereal stocks are high. 
  
The Economic Research Service (Shapouri 2001) estimates for 1997-2000 that a 
substantial gap existed between food aid deliveries and food levels required to maintain the level 
of consumption that occurred over the past three years (the status quo) or the level of food 
required to met nutritional needs. Figure 4 compares estimated needs with food aid deliveries 
and indicates that food aid has fallen short of estimated needs. Looking to the future, the ERS 
(1999) estimates that food aid required to maintain per capita consumption at 1996-98 levels in 
67 developing countries is 13 mmt, while the food gap to meet minimum nutritional 
requirements is estimated to be 15mmt. In meetings of the Agriculture Committee of the WTO, 
representatives of the FAO have repeatedly emphasized that the food security of least-developed 
and net food-importing countries remains precarious. Other analysts have concluded that 
developing countries have or will experience a decline in food security (IFPRI 1998; WTO 
1999a; WTO 1999b).  
 
Another factor impinging on the question of the adequacy of food aid is that emergency 
aid more than doubled between 1990 and 1999, growing from 19 percent to 43 percent of total 
food donations. The increase in complex and long lasting emergencies means that fewer tons of 
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Figure 4. Actual Food Aid and Food Aid Needs, 1997-1999 
 
Note: Actual food aid received by 67 countries. 
 
Major Issues for Food Aid 
Food aid issues can, in general terms, be characterized by the tension that exists between 
fulfillment of the humanitarian goals held by donors and their political and (most relevant to our 
concerns) producer support objectives. Further disciplines need to be cognizant of the issues 
involved in providing adequate food aid while restricting aid that serves solely political goals. 
 
Achievement of the humanitarian and development goals of food aid requires evaluation of 
the following questions: 
§ How effective are current institutions and programs in anticipating and alleviating hunger 
caused by natural disasters and political strife? 
§ Under what conditions does food aid promote economic development in general, and 
development of the agricultural sector in particular? 
§ What level of food aid is sufficient to meet needs and how can it be effectively targeted? 
§ What impact have reforms under the Uruguay Round Agreement had on the food security of 
developing countries? 
 
Achievement of the producer support objective requires an evaluation of the impact of 
food aid on international markets: 
§ Does food aid create additional demand for agricultural commodities? Additionality exists at 
a point in time if food aid expands demand by reaching consumers who would not have been 
in the market. Additionality can also exist over time, as food aid increases the economic 
wealth of developing countries and simulates imports in the future. Additionality is 
important, as it is one determinant of the impact of food aid on world prices.  
§ What is the impact of food aid on the market share of agricultural exporters in recipient 










Status Quo Gap Nutritional Gap Actual Food Aid   37 
§ What is the impact of food aid on U.S. producer incomes, and how effective is it compared to 
other producer support policies? 
 
A vast literature has addressed these questions and few clear conclusions have emerged. 
Much research has been extremely critical of past food aid programs, and donor and multilateral 
agencies have invested heavily in improvement of their programs. Widespread disagreement 
exists over how effective aid programs are despite a desire on the part of governments – both 
donors and recipients – to end hunger and promote development.   
 
Food Aid in the Uruguay Round Agreement  
  The URA addresses food aid in the Agreement on Agriculture and in a Ministerial 
Decision. Article 10.4 of the URAA states that (1) food aid shall not be tied to commercial 
exports of agricultural products to recipient countries; (2) that food aid must be carried out in 
accordance with the FAO’s “Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations,” and 
(3) that food aid be provided fully in grant form or meet the terms for concessional food aid as 
provided in Article 4 of the 1986 Food Aid Convention. These rules incorporate the use of 
protocols and multilateral institutions that developed over a long period of time. 
 
Food aid was one of the concerns held by Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing 
countries who anticipated difficulties in importing adequate supplies of food on reasonable terms 
during the implementation of Uruguay Round reforms. These concerns were addressed in a 
ministerial decision
4 (subsequently referred to as the NFIDC Decision) that was adopted as a part 
of the URA. The NFIDC Decision committed the WTO to: 
•  Review the level of food aid established by the Committee on Food Aid under the Food Aid 
Convention 1986 and to initiate negotiations in the appropriate forum to establish a level of 
food aid commitments sufficient to meet the legitimate needs of developing countries during 
the reform programme; 
•  Adopt guidelines to ensure that an increasing percentage of basic food stuffs is provided to 
least-developed and net-food importing developing countries fully in grant form and/or on 
appropriate concessional terms in line with Article IV of the Food Aid Convention 1986;  
•  To give full consideration in the context of their aid programmes to requests for the provision 
of technical and financial assistance to least-developed and net food-importing countries to 
improve their agricultural productivity and infrastructure.  
 
  An obvious difficulty presented by the NFIDC Decision is the ambiguity of the language 
used making it difficult for all parties to agree whether or not these commitments have been met. 
The WTO did review food aid levels and did initiate negotiations under the Food Aid 
Convention, resulting in the 1999 FAC Agreement. The result of the convention may be 
considered unsatisfactory by food aid recipients as the level of commitment by donors declined. 
For that reason and many others, statements by many developing countries indicate that they do 
not consider that commitments made by the WTO have been met. Eleven developing countries 
state in their position paper “Despite the promises, there has been no political will to activate the 
Marrakesh Decision in order to address the problems of net-food-importing developing countries 
                                                 
4Ministerial Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least 
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(NFIDC). This had been the avenue developing countries had expected to receive compensation 
for the negative effects of liberalization” (WTO 2000b). This failure is one reason for reluctance 
on the part of many developing countries to negotiate for further reforms (Bridges Weekly Trade 
Digest 2000a; Bridges Weekly Trade Digest 2000b; WTO 2001a).  
   
Negotiating Positions 
While food security and agricultural development are prominent concerns in position 
papers, food aid is specifically addressed by only a few countries and trading blocs. Proposals 
reflect the concern of exporting nations that food aid may be used by exporting nations to 
circumvent their export subsidy restrictions.  
 
The European Union’s position asks that in conjunction with export subsidy disciplines, 
that other implicit subsidies such as food aid also be disciplined. It includes these specific 
proposals concerning food aid (WTO 2000c): 
§ Food aid should be given only in grant form and only to least developed and net food 
importing developing countries; 
§ A code of conduct covering food aid operations be established;  
§ The type of operations to be considered as food aid be clearly defined; 
§ Notifications be mandatory and ex ante not ex poste; and  
§ A list of recipients is established and criteria for emergency situations are developed. 
 
The United States has not advanced specific proposals for food aid (WTO 2000d) 
beyond: 
§ Continuing current disciplines in Article 10.4;  
§ Renewing donor commitment to food aid; and  
§ Strengthening WTO rules on export restrictions.
5  
 
India discusses food aid within the context of food security (WTO 2001c) and: 
§ Supports criteria on food aid to ensure that food aid is distinct from export subsidies; and  
§ States that food aid should be offered regardless of the world market price.  
 
Egypt proposes (WTO 2001d) that: 
§ The NFIDC Decision be reviewed and strengthened;  
§ A fund be created for NFIDCs and LDCs, which would obtain a rebate on their food import 
bills after they have purchased their requirements on the open market at unsubsidized prices. 
The Fund would be financed from a number of sources, prominent amongst which would be 




A group of developing countries including the MERCOSUR countries (Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay), and Chile, Bolivia and Costa Rica (WTO 2000e) propose that food aid 
to NFIDCs should be given without commercial conditions and fully in grant form. Finally, the 
                                                 
5 This statement is taken verbatim from the U.S. position and its meaning is unclear. However, it is possible that it 
means the U.S. wants to discipline export taxes. 
6 See Trueblood and Shapouri for a discussion of an import insurance program that could provide a replacement for 
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only point on food aid made by the CAIRNS (WTO 2000f) group is that additional disciplines 
are needed on “non-commercial transactions,” and export credits and credit guarantees. Some 
donors and recipients share the desire for food aid to be distinct from export subsidies and 
market development programs and that it be given as aid in grant form. Other position papers 
have stated that that as recipient country food aid needs and circumstances are diverse that limits 
on the form of food aid may not serve a useful purpose.  
 
The EU proposal seeks to clarify when transactions are bone fide food aid and when they 
constitute export subsidies. The difficulty is that many transactions do a bit of both and the 
danger is that limiting export subsidies may limit donations of food that could be useful to 
NFIDCs. Given the host of government agencies, multilateral agencies and private voluntary 
agencies involved it will be difficult to conduct negotiations within the structure of the WTO.  
 
Options for Reform 
 
Criteria for Food Aid and List of Recipients 
Proposals from the EU and some developing countries advocate for criteria to define food 
aid. This proposal is likely motivated by past and potential abuse of food aid by donors. In 
addition to its humanitarian goals, food aid has been used by many donors to achieve political 
and commercial objectives (Ruttan 1996; Barrett 1999; Christensen 1999). Particularly in the 
United States, food aid has been used as a mechanism to dispose of excessive commodity stocks 
and as a tool for market development. Criteria for food aid need to address the types of 
transaction (terms and conditions) that are considered food aid and criteria for selecting 
recipients.  
 
One criteria for food aid advanced by some countries and blocs is food aid should be 
given solely in grant form. The NFIDC Decision moves in this direction, but is limited to stating 
that an increasing percent of food aid should be on grant terms (or on a concessional basis as in 
the FAC Article 4). Under the 1999 Food Aid Convention, donors agreed that all food aid to 
least-developed countries through the FAC will be in the form of grants. With the exception of 
the United States, all donors through the Food Aid Convention currently provide 100 percent of 
their food aid on grant terms. For the United States this figure varied between 83 percent and 93 
percent of U.S. food aid between 1995/96 and 1998/99 (WTO 1999a; WTO 2000g). 
   
The most prominent food aid program that operates on a concessional basis, (subsidized 
credit) is the U.S. PL 480 Title I Program, which has a stated goal of promoting U.S. agricultural 
exports. Negotiators should consider moving Title I from food aid to export credits. As 
mentioned in the discussion on export credits, those programs are also mandated to provide 
terms favorable for least-developed and net food-importing countries. Negotiating PL 480 Title I 
in the context of export credit negotiations may meet both donor and recipient country desire to 
eliminate unclear distinctions between some food aid programs and export credit programs. 
 
As criteria for food aid has been a troublesome issue in the past (FAO 1992) it may be 
useful for negotiations to categorize transactions that are clearly food aid and those where 
disagreement exists. The Consultative Committee on Surplus Disposal (CSSD) has operated 
since 1954 under the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. This committee 40   
has a comprehensive list of transactions that could serve as a basis for negotiations on the types 
of transactions that constitute food aid. Transactions that are widely agreed upon as constituting 
food aid could be unrestricted and free from challenge. Another category of food aid could 
include transactions that are not uniformly considered food aid, such as programs with overriding 
market development objectives, and these could be subject to tighter consultation and 
notification requirements, and to overall limitations. 
 
Some protocols already exist to ensure that a greater percentage of food aid is directed 
towards countries with the greatest need. Under the 1999 FAC, donors agree to give priority to 
least-developed and lower-income developing countries, and other eligible recipients are lower 
middle income developing countries and all others on the WTO list of NFIDCs when they are 
experiencing food emergencies or when food aid operations are targeted at vulnerable groups. 
Further WTO criteria for recipients would need to involve negotiations between donors and 
recipients within the WTO, the World Food Program, the FAO, the Food Aid Convention and a 
large number of non-governmental organizations.  
 
A tighter definition of food aid is not likely to make a significant difference in the degree 
to which food aid disrupts world markets (unless it ensures additionality). However, if all donors 
abided by common definitions of food aid, it may be easier for agricultural exporters to tolerate a 
small price-depressing effect associated with food aid. If criteria are successfully used to 
effectively target food aid to countries in need, then countries receiving food aid may benefit 
from a more effective use of available supplies.  
 
Notification of Food Aid 
The EU wants to establish stronger notification requirements for food aid. Notification 
requirements are important in many areas covered by the URAA. For example, notification is 
required by countries who maintain state trading enterprises, or who administer tariff-rate quotas 
for imports. Notification and consultation requirements for food aid occur quarterly and are 
useful in increasing knowledge of other countries actual and proposed actions that may affect the 
market. In turn, this knowledge is useful in working through conflict during its initial stages. 
  
Since 1954, the Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal has been the primary 
international vehicle for notification and consultation over food aid and concessional transactions 
(FAO 1992). Protocols govern what transactions must be notified, some on an ex ante and others 
on an ex post basis. Over the last ten years an average of 62 percent of food aid shipments have 
been notified through the CSSD. One course of action would be for the WTO to use the expertise 
embedded in this organization, adjust notification requirements, and bring this existing 
institution within the purview of the WTO. Alternatively, the WTO could simply make more 
widely available the information reported to CSSD.  
 
Conclusions 
The multiple objectives held for food aid by many donors means that food aid may at 
times be used as an export subsidy to reduce unwanted surpluses. The most explicit form this 
could take would be to tie donation of food to a requirement that the recipient will import 
agricultural commodities from the donor. The URAA prohibited this. However, the Agreement 
did not discipline more implicit subsidies, disciplines that are currently being sought by the 
European Union. Adequate (higher than current levels) food aid guaranteed in advance by donors   41 
and delivered through the World Food Programme would solve some problems. For recipients 
this would further weaken the link between surplus production and food aid, and result in food 
aid being available in times of shortage when it is most needed. For countries concerned with the 
impact of food aid on world markets it would divorce food aid from sporadic surplus disposal. 
The problem with this solution is that donor governments, particularly the United States, rely on 
food aid achieving both producer support and humanitarian objectives in order to gain the 
political support necessary to sustain the cost of food aid programs. While food aid’s current 
situation is not ideal, insisting on the ideal solution could result in further reductions of the 
amount of food aid supplied by the United States. U.S. support for foreign aid has declined, as 
indicated by a decrease in U.S. official development assistance from 0.20 to 0.09 percent of GNP 
between 1992 and 1997 (OECD 2001). A diversity of food aid programs meeting multiple 
objectives appears to be necessary to sustain current levels of food aid. This means that the WTO 
should proceed cautiously in attempting to devise further food aid disciplines.  
 
This brings up the question of the role of the WTO in food aid issues. First and foremost, 
the goal of the WTO is to reduce distortions to trade. The danger in negotiating food aid issues in 
the context of the WTO is that other and more pressing questions will remain unspoken and 
unanswered. These question include whether or not the level of food aid guaranteed through the 
Food Aid Convention is adequate, how to target aid to meet the needs and concerns of recipients 
as well as donors, and how to use food aid effectively in the development process. The expertise 
that has developed on these questions largely resides in other institutions, such as the World 
Food Programme, individual country development and aid agencies, and private voluntary 
organizations.   
 
In summary, there are two immediate difficulties facing the discussion of food aid in the 
WTO. First, disciplines for food aid need to be discussed in a venue that recognizes the tradeoffs 
between the adequacy of food and the need for disciplines on the export subsidy element of food 
aid. Secondly, food aid issues need to be discussed in a venue where food aid recipients share 
power over the decisions. Neither the WTO, nor existing multilateral institutions concerned with 
food aid, appear to fulfill both requirements. 
 
  It is unlikely that exiting institutions will be changed to accommodate these concerns 
before negotiations begin in earnest. Given that limitation, WTO negotiations should err on the 
side of meeting the interests of recipient nations. Governments receiving of food aid do, at times, 
have urgent concerns in meeting the nutritional needs of their people, and these needs are more 
pressing than donor country concerns over potential small impacts on market share and prices.  
Recommendations for negotiations are summarized in Box 4. 
 
Box 4: Food Aid Options for Reform 
§ Identify food aid transactions that are not widely accepted as food aid and subject those to 
stricter notification and consultation requirements and to overall limits; 
§ Improve notification protocols under the CSSD and make this information easily accessible; 
and    
§ Exercise caution in new disciplines for food aid that could result in a reduction of overall 
food aid availability. 




Examination of country position papers submitted to the WTO to date indicate a high 
level of commitment to reduce the level of export subsidies in all forms, and to regulate 
institutions through which implicit subsidies could be offered. Quantitatively, EU export 
subsidies are large enough to influence world prices and so distort trade. The other implicit 
subsidies examined here are small in magnitude and are unlikely to be currently having 
significant distorting effects on trade.  
 
Theory tells us that direct export subsidies are among the most expensive ways to support 
producers, and have few redeeming benefits. Relative to other policies they are most likely to 
capture market share from competitors, and least likely to expand worldwide demand. In theory, 
targeted export subsidies through price discrimination can benefit both producers and competing 
exporters. All practical export subsidy programs rely to a substantial degree on export targeting. 
  
Most common complex institutional arrangements (like export subsidies) address 
multiple policy objectives. These institutions have evolved to meet numerous and conflicting 
objectives – including resolving the tradeoff between the exercise of market power and 
supporting producers. Several of the institutional mechanisms that can result in export subsidies 
are also designed to achieve multiple social and humanitarian goals. For example, food aid not 
only is intended to dispose of surpluses, but also alleviate hunger and malnutrition in poor 
countries, and has also been used as a tool to develop and expand export markets. Credit 
programs can be an essential tool in doing business in international markets and credit can be 
required when importing countries face financial crises and hence liquidity constraints. Credit 
programs are also used by governments to encourage domestic firms to enter international 
markets.  
 
Export credits and food aid best illustrate the need to be careful in the development of 
WTO rules disciplining implicit export subsidies. For example, Australia proposes limiting term 
lengths on loans to discipline adequately but does not eliminate the subsidy elements of the 
export credit program. If further disciplines requiring interest rates on loans to fully reflect 
country risk premiums are enacted, the likely consequence of these programs is that benefits 
entirely accrue to international banks instead of poor developing countries, or that loans are not 
forthcoming and food consumption declines.  
 
While export credit programs may be a device to compete for market share, when they 
relieve liquidity constraints, they are likely to bring additional demand for commodities to world 
markets. Similarly, some forms of food aid can increase demand by providing food that would 
not otherwise be consumed. Whenever an implicit subsidization program brings additional 
demand, there is the potential for all exporters to benefit from the market impact. Export credit 
and food aid programs now have a small impact on world markets, are likely to create some 
additional demand, and meet various humanitarian and social goals. Efforts to discipline them 
need to take this into account.  
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If food aid is disciplined in a manner to prevent its use as a surplus disposal tool, there is 
a risk that food aid levels will fall to even lower magnitudes, such as was evident in years of 
shortage like 1995/96. In an ideal world, it would be desirable for donors to commit to 
substantial levels of food aid regardless of market conditions, however, limiting the disposal of 
surpluses could have a negative effect on hungry populations in some years. In an ideal world it 
would also be desirable for WTO to develop rules that distinguish between food aid programs 
that generate additional demand and programs that capture market share. However, in reality this 
is difficult to do, and many programs achieve a bit of both objectives.  
 
It is also difficult to write rules that identify and measure export subsidies. This is 
especially true for joint differentiated products, where defining a world price to compare to a 
domestic price is difficult. The problem of writing rules is similar to the problem faced in 
competition policy, where rules are based on observed market structure rather than on conduct 
and performance, where it is extremely difficult to ascertain the use of market power. The 
discussion of export subsidy issues indicates that difficulties exist in the practical application of 
WTO discipline. The WTO ruling on Canadian dairy policy indicates that consumer-financed 
export subsidies are unacceptable. Further questions exist over the potential for cross-
subsidization between commodities. This could occur when STEs, marketing boards, or private 
firm’s pool returns for a variety of products, and raises additional questions over the definition of 
a product. As private firms are likely to also engage in cross-subsidization, it is important that the 
WTO apply the same discipline to public entities and private firms.  
 
It has been observed that when reforms are forced on state trading agencies, that many 
times institutional innovations will occur so that the domestic government can continue to 
achieve the same domestic policy goals using different institutional forms. This is a problem 
with disciplining an institutional form rather than a behavior, and may make effective action 
within the WTO difficult. 
 
General subsidies are largely an EU problem, and their reform will require reform of 
domestic support measures, as well. The EU has a history of reform of its agricultural policy and 
has indicated further willingness to reduce export subsidies. Historically, the EU has financed 
their domestic support to some extent by taxing consumers as well as through the treasury. 
Political scientists have recognized the political difficulty of 15 countries agreeing on budgetary 
allocations to support farmers, especially when collecting tax revenue on an EU basis is difficult.  
 
The reduction of export subsidies in the context of EU policy will require a much broader 
reform of agricultural policy. Further reform will require changing either the extent of support to 
agriculture or the means by which that support is achieved. Past reform indicates that this is what 
has been occurring, and it is likely that both reductions in support and changes in the means by 
which it is financed will continue. 
 
 It may be the case that the EU is willing to trade-off their relative large general subsidies 
for the much smaller implicit subsidies in the trade practices of its competitors in food aid, STEs 
and export credits. If the EU is looking to the WTO to assist in disciplining its own export 
subsidies in the process of reforming its agricultural policy, this trade-off allows them to achieve 
this discipline while at the same time gaining concessions from their competitors.  44   
 
 It must be born in mind that the overriding objective of export subsidies is the 
achievement of domestic policy goals. This is also true of STEs who exist to achieve domestic 
goals beyond the exercise of market power in international trade. Domestic support policies, 
such as U.S. loan deficiency payments and emergency payments to farmers, address these same 
objectives in a different manner. Some economists have labeled these polices as export subsidies 
due to their effect on international markets. If trade-offs in the WTO must be made on 
comparably valued concessions, then we need to look at trading off EU export subsidies against 
US programs to support farm income. Progress in negotiations will be facilitated by trade-offs 
between market access, domestic support and export subsidy issues instead of being confined to 
trade-offs within a particular category.  
 
 Further progress within the WTO is likely to be slow since existing institutions reflect 
differing circumstances and preferences across countries, and these institutions respond slowly to 
changes in the external environment. Existing institutions also reflect trade-offs in achieving 
domestic policy objectives, and as limitations are imposed policymakers will innovate to 
continue to achieve those objectives in the face of WTO limitations. The challenge faced by 
economists in measuring distortions to world markets is increased enormously by the variety and 
complexity of institutions that exist. An analysis of how they work in practice, and recognition 
that some of these institutions achieve important domestic political or humanitarian goals while 
having fairly small impacts on world markets, will be more useful to the negotiating process than 
advancing a rigid doctrine advocating for a particular institutional form, or focusing only on 
trade distortions.  




Abbott, P.C., and L.M. Young. 2000. “State Trading Enterprises and the WTO: Importing versus 
Exporting State Trading Enterprises.” Paper presented by Philip Abbott at the 
Globalization and New Agricultural Trade Rules for the 21
st Century conference, 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, February. 
 
Abbott, P.C., and B.A. Morse. 2000. “Tariff Rate Quota Implementation and Administration by 
Developing Countries.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, forthcoming. 
 
Abbott, P.C., and L.M. Young. 1999. “Wheat-Importing State Trading Enterprises: Impacts on 
the World Wheat Market.” Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 47:119-136. 
 
Abbott, P.C. 1998. “Competition Policy and Agricultural Trade.” Paper presented at the OECD 
Workshop on Emerging Trade Issues in Agriculture. COM.AGR/CA/TD/TC/WS(89)106.  
 
Abbott, P.C., P.L. Paarlberg, and J.A. Sharples. 1987. “Targeted Agricultural Export Subsidies 
and Social Welfare.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69(4):723-732. 
 
Ackerman, K.Z., and P.M. Dixit. 1999. “An Introduction to State Trading in Agriculture.” U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, ERS, AER 783, October. 
 
Anania, G., M. Bohman, and C.A. Carter. 1992. “United States Export Subsidies in Wheat: 
Strategic Trade Policy or Expensive Beggar-Thy-Neighbor Tactic?” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 74:532-545.   
 
Barichello, R., and J. Vercammen. 1994. Export Sales Under Credit Arrangements. 
Winnepeg:Canadian Wheat Board. 
 
Baron, D. 1983. The Export-Import Bank: An Economic Analysis. New York:Academic Press. 
 
Barrett, C. 1999. “Does Food Aid Stabilize Food Availability?” Policy Reform, Market Stability 
and Food Security. R. Paarlberg and T.L. Roe, eds. Proceedings of a conference of the 
International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium, September. 
 
Bohman, M., C.A. Carter, and J. Dorfman. 1991. “The Welfare Effects of Targeted Export 
Subsidies: A General Equilibrium Approach.” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 73:693-702. 
 
Brander, J.A., and B.J. Spencer. 1985. “Export Subsidies and International Market Share 
Rivalry.” Journal of International Economics 18:83-100. 
 
Bridges Weekly Trade Digest. 2000a. “WTO Implementation To Remain a Priority.” Vol 15, 
No.4, www.ictsd.org/html/weekly/story4.06-02-01.htm., February 2.  
 46   
Bridges Weekly Trade Digest. 2000b. Implementation Held Back by North-South Issues.” Vol 4, 
No. 26, Http://www.ictsd.org , Sept. 26.  
 
Carter, C.A., and R.M.A. Loyns. 1996. “The Economics of Single Desk Selling of Western 
Canadian Grain.” Edmonton: Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development. 
 
Christensen, C. 1999. “The New Policy Environment for Food Aid: The Challenge of Sub-
Saharan Africa.” Policy Reform, Market Stability and Food Security. R. Paarlberg and 
T.L. Roe, eds. Proceedings of a conference of the International Agricultural Trade 
Research Consortium, Sept. 
 
Dahl, B., W. Wilson, and C. Gustafson. 1995. “Valuing Options Provisions for Credit Guarantee 
Programs.” Agricultural Economics Report no. 330. North Dakota State University, 
Fargo, June. 
 
Dahl, B., D. Johnson, W. Wilson, and C. Gustafson. 1995. “Credit Guarantee Programs in 
International Grain Markets: Background and Issues.” Agricultural Economics Report no. 
326, North Dakota State University, Fargo, March. 
 
Dierson, M., W. Wilson, B. Dahl, and V. Satyanarayana. 1997. “Additionality of Credit 
Guarantees for US Wheat Exports.” Agricultural Economics Report no. 377. North 
Dakota State University, Fargo, July.  
 
Dixit, P.M. and T. Josling. 1997. State Trading in Agriculture: An Analytical Framework. 
International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium, Working Paper 97-4, July. 
 
Economic Research Service. 1999. Food Security Assessment: Situation and Outlook Series. 
GFA-11, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington DC, December. 
 
 ———. 2001. The Road Ahead: Agricultural Policy Reform in the WTO-Summary Report. 
Agricultural Economic Report no. 797, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington DC, 
December. 
 
Falcon, W. P., and E. A. Monke. 1979-1980. “International Trade in Rice.” Food Research 
Institute Studies. 17(3):279-304. 
 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 1992. Principles of Surplus 
Disposal and Consultative Obligations of Member Nations. Rome. 
 
Fisher, F. 1963. “A Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Food Surplus Disposal on Agricultural 
Production in Recipient Countries.” Journal of Farm Economics 34:863-875. 
 
General Accounting Office (GAO). 1992. Loan Guarantees: Export Credit Guarantee 
Programs’ Costs are High. GAO/GDD-93-45, December. 
   47 
———. 1995. Former Soviet Union: Credit Worthiness of Successor States and US Export 
Credit Guarantees. GAO/GGD-95-60, February. 
 
Haley, S.L. 1995. “Product Differentiation in Wheat Trade Modeling.” Technical Bulletin 
No.1838, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington D.C. 
 
Hyberg, B., M. Smith, D. Skully, and C. Davidson. 1995. “Export Credit Guarantees: the 
Commodity Credit Corporation and US Agricultural Export Policy.” Food Policy 20:27-
39.  
 
International Food Policy Research Institute. 1998. “The Changing Outlook for Food Aid.” From 
http://www.ifpri.cgiar.org/textonly/2020/newslet/nv%5F1198/2nv1198a.htm.  
 
International Grains Council. 2001. “Grains Trade and Food Security Cooperation.” From 
www.igc.org.uk/brochure/broengmain.htm.  
 
Josling, T. 1998. “State Trading and the WTO: Agricultural Trade Policy Aspects.” Paper 
presented at the Workshop on the Role of the State in Agricultural Trade, Stanford 
University, November 19-21. 
 
Josling, T. 1998. “Agricultural Trade Policy: Completing the Reform.” Launching New Global 
Trade Talks. Institute for International Economics, Special Report 12. J. Schott, ed. 
 
Kallio, P., and P.C. Abbott. 1998. “Export Subsidies and Switching Costs in an Imperfectly 
Competitive International Wheat Market.” Selected paper at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Agricultural Economics Association, Salt Lake City, UT. August. 
 
Koo, W., and D. Karema. 1991. “Determinants of World Wheat Trade Flows and Policy 
Analysis.” Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 39:439-455. 
 
Kraft, D.F., W.H. Furtan, and E.W. Tyrchniewicz. 1996. “Performance Evaluation of the 
Canadian Wheat Board.” Winnipeg:Canadian Wheat Board. 
 
Leetmaa, S.E. 2001. “Analysis of Export Subsidy Elimination.” USDA Agricultural Trade 
Report, May. 
 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 1998. International Trade 
in Agriculture and Food Products: The Role of State Trading. Country paper submitted 
by Canada to the Joint Agriculture/Trade Workshop Sponsored by the OECD, October 
26-27, www.oecd.org/agr/trade. 
 
———.2001. Aid Flows from Development Assistance Committee Members, Development 
Assistance Committee, www.oecd.org. 
 
———. 2000a. An Analysis of Officially Supported Export Credits in Agriculture. 
COM/AGR/TD/WP(200)91/Final. Paris, December. 48   
 
———. 2000b. A Forward-Looking Analysis of Export Subsidies in Agriculture. Paris.  
 
 
———. 1997. “The Knaepen Package,” www.oecd.org/ech/act/xcred, Paris. 
 
———. 1998. “Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits,” 
www.oecd.org/ech/act/xcred, Paris. 
 
Paarlberg, P. 1999. “Observations on Export Subsidies and Concessional Sales Programs in 
Support of ERS WTO Work.” Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, January. 
 
Raynaud, A. 1992. Financing Exports to Developing Countries. Paris:OECD. 
 
Rude, J. 2000. “Reform of Agricultural Export Credit Programs.” The Estey Journal of 
International Law and Trade Policy 1(1):66-82. 
 
Ruttan, V. 1996. United States Development Assistance Policy: The Domestic Politics of Foreign 
Economic Aid. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press. 
 
Schluep, E., and H. de Gorter. 2000. “The Definition of Export Subsidies and the Agreement on 
Agriculture.” Selected paper presented at the meeting of the International Association of 
Agricultural Economics, Berlin, Germany. August. 
 
Schmitz, A., A. McCalla, D. Mitchell, and C. Carter. 1981. Grain Export Cartels. Cambridge: 
Ballinger Press. 
 
Schmitz, A., H. Furtan., H. Brooks, and R. Gray. 1997. “The Canadian Wheat Board: How Well 
Has It Performed?” Choices, First Quarter, pp. 36-42. 
 
Shapouri, S. 2001. Personal communication, Economic Research Service, February 9.  
 
Shapouri, S., and M. Missiaen. 1990. “Food Aid: Motivation and Allocation Criteria.” FAER # 
240. ERS, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture. 
 
Sharples, J.A. 1984. “The Economics of Targeted Export Subsidies.” Staff Paper No. 84-11. 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, July. 
 
Skully, D. 1996. “Price Discrimination and State Trading: The Case of US Wheat.” European 
Review of Agricultural Economics 18:585-598.  
 
Sorenson, V. L. 1991. “The Economics and Institutional Dimension of State Trading.” In State 
Trading in International Agricultural Markets: Institutional Dimensions and Selected 
Cases, edited by L. Vernon, et al. Washington, DC: International Council on Agriculture 
and Trade, December. 
   49 
Sumner, D.1996. “The Role of Domestic Market Price Regulations in International Trade: The 
Case of Dairy Policy in the United States.” Paper presented at the annual meetings of the 
AEA, San Francisco, January. 
 
Tangermann, S., and T. Josling. 1999. “The Interests of Developing Countries in the Next Round 
of WTO Agricultural Negotiations.” Paper prepared for the UNTAD Program on 
Developing a Proactive and Coherent Trade Agenda for African Countries, November.  
 
Trueblood, M., and S. Shapouri. 2000. “Safety Net Policy in a Global Context: Low Income 
Food Importing Countries.” Selected paper, International Association of Agricultural 
Economists, Berlin, Germany, August. 
 
Veeman, M., M. Fulton, and B. Larue. 1999. “International Trade in Agricultural and Food 
Products: The Role of State Trading Enterprises.” Economic and Policy Analysis 
Directorate, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Ottawa, April. 
 
Washington Trade Daily. 2000. Brussels to Table Ag Negotiating Proposal. From 
www.washingtontradedaily.com, December 11.  
 
Wilson,W., W. Koo, C.A. Carter, and Y. Tedros. 1987. “Import Loyalty in International Wheat 
Markets.” Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 34:295-305. 
 
Wilson, W., and S. Yang. 1996. “Credit Allocation Decisions of Wheat Exporting Countries.” 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 18:53-65. 
 
 World Food Programme (WFP). 2000. Annex to Annual Report. WFP/EB.A/2000/3-A. 
Available from www.wfp.org.  
 
 World Trade Organization (WTO). 1998. “Annual Monitoring Exercise in Respect of the 
Follow-Up to the Ministerial Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative 
Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing 
Developing Countries.” Committee on Agriculture, G/AG/GEN/31, November.  
 
———. 1999a. “Implementation of the Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative 
Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food Importing 
Developing Countries.” Committee on Agriculture, G/AG/W/42Rev.2, October 4. 
 
———. 1999b. “Statement by the Observer from the Food and Agriculture Organization 
Presented to the 25-26 March 1999 Meeting of the Committee on Agriculture.” 
Committee on Agriculture, G/AG/GEN/36,  March 31.  
 
———. 2000a. “Second Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture 23-30 June 2000 
Statement by Mauritius.” Committee on Agriculture Special Session. G/AG/NG/W/28, 
July 11. 
 50   
———. 2000b. “Agreement on Agriculture: Special and Differential Treatment and a 
Development Box.” Committee on Agriculture Special Session. G/AG/NG/W/13, June 
23. 
 
———. 2000c. “European Communities Proposal on Export Competition.” Committee on 
Agriculture Special Session. G/aG/NG/W/34. September 18.  
 
———. 2000d. “Proposal for Comprehensive Long-Term Agricultural Trade Reform: 
Submission from the United States.” Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, 
G/AG/NG/W/15, June 23.  
 
———. 2000e. “Export Subsidies-Food Security or Food Dependency? A Discussion Paper 
presented by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Ururguay (MERCOSUR), Chile, Bolivia 
and Costa Rica.” Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, G/AG/NG/W/38, 
September 27.  
 
———. 2000f. “WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Cairns Group Negotiating Proposal Export 
Competition.” Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, G/AG/NG/W/11, June 16. 
 
———. 2000g. “Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform 
Programme on Least-Developing and Net-Food Importing Developing Countries (NFIDC 
Decision): Actions Taken Within the Framework of the Decision as Notified by 
Members.” Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, G/AG/NG/S/4, April 27. 
 
———. 2001a. “Committee Discusses Unfilled Quotas, Export Credit,” Agriculture Committee, 
WTO News, from http:www.wto.org/english/news_e/news00_e/ag_Nov00_3.htm, 
February.  
 
———. 2001b. “ State Trading: Notifications Pursuant to Article XVII:4(a) of the GATT 1994 
and Paragraph 1 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII.” Working 
Party on State Trading Enterprises, G/STE/N/7, 26 February.  
 
——— 2001c. “Negotiations on WTO Agreement on Agriculture: Proposals by India in the 
areas of: (i) Food Security, (ii) Market Access, (iii) Domestic Support, and (iv) Export 
Competition.” Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, G/AG/NG/W/102, January 
15.  
 
———. 2001d. “Comprehensive Proposal By The Arab Republic of Egypt To the WTO 
Negotiations on Agriculture.” G/AG/NG/W/107, Committee on Agriculture Special 
Session, February.  
 
Young, L. 1999. “Prevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets.” 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 47(4):351-362. 
 
 